tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14247942.post112698224612636942..comments2023-08-10T05:32:21.163-04:00Comments on An Examined Life: The Meaning of MeaningVitae Scrutatorhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12808120163472036743noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14247942.post-1127231280090689052005-09-20T11:48:00.000-04:002005-09-20T11:48:00.000-04:001. I was myself very attracted to nominalism when ...1. I was myself very attracted to nominalism when I was in graduate school. I suppose that <I>is</I> the threat that it poses: it seems to be very attractive, especially if one wants to resist the ontological committment to natural kinds. I think that in the philosophy of language the case for nominalism is no better nor worse than the case for anything else--it all boils down to what one's <I>a priori</I> ontological committments are, and there is no particular ontological committment that one <I>must</I> make in order to do philosophy of language, so one simply uses the argument that is most congruent to what one already believes. The case is somewhat different in biology, I think, since it seems to me that there is a kind of prima facie case to be made for the intuition that there is a real difference of <I>some</I> kind between, say, a man and a dog, or between a dog and a fire hydrant. If it is possible for the human mind to conceive of such differences then it is also possible that such differences are underwritten, somehow, in the ontological structure of things. Of course that would not follow of necessity, but it is a starting point. With Aristotelian natural kinds we even have a modicum of empirical confirmation: those kinds of natural entities do seem to develop and reproduce in the manner required by his metaphysics--excluding natural selection, of course. But probably even in biology there is a fair amount of <I>a priori</I> supposition going on: one is generally either a materialist or a non-materialist <I>before</I> going into biology. To put it another way, one doesn't <I>usually</I> study the empirical sciences in order to <I>discover whether</I> materialism is true or false--rather those sciences presuppose it. Same with empiricism.<BR/><BR/>2. I would say, in response to (2.1), that it is my view that human beings <I>are</I> "merely" natural, but I suppose that would depend on what you take "merely" to imply when conjoined to "natural." Granted, I don't think we're strictly material entities, if that's what you mean by <I>reductively</I> materialist, but I certainly think that we <I>are</I> material entities. This has some bearing on (2.2), because it seems that you are endorsing the very distinction that I'm trying to be wary of--that "natural" means <I>only</I> the reductively materialist, empirically discoverable world. On my view, that is not the extension of the word "natural." If we restrict "natural" to "creation" then clearly God is "outside" of nature, but nature is not outside of God and that would be the sense in which the "super" natural needs to be invoked in explanation: as a necessary first cause.<BR/><BR/>3. Metaphors are always risky. I'm pretty happy with that one, though, because a non-believer literally "doesn't get it" when it comes to belief. On my view, the capacity to believe in God is in itself a supernatural fact (a gift from God), not a natural one, so it is unsurprising to find folks who cannot make the connection. It is possible for us to have knowledge of God, because faith and reason do not conflict on this view--but the capacity for mental assent to what one knows is another matter.<BR/><BR/>But none of this is intended to suggest that the non-believe <I>will never</I> see or understand or believe. You're right that the metaphor fails in that sense, although I suppose one could argue that a person born blind might be able to have an operation that would restore sight. But the non-believer <I>always</I> has an "operation" available to him: the abandonment of self is <I>always</I> possible spiritually (though maybe not always <I>easy</I> psychologically). I say more about what I mean by that in my post <A HREF="http://examinelife.blogspot.com/2005/08/take-up-your-cross-daily.html" REL="nofollow">Take Up Your Cross Daily</A>.<BR/><BR/>The question about the blind man sailing "in fact" raises an interesting question. Sure, the non-believer can discuss the "intellectual" or "rational" aspects of faith with the believer, but to what extent is he really going to grasp what is going on? Maybe the blind man <I>can</I> form some idea of what sailing is like, but just as we cannot know what it is like <I>for a bat</I> to be a bat, so we cannot know what it is like for a sighted person to experience sailing.<BR/><BR/>Now, <I>on the assumption</I> that experiencing sailing as a sighted person experiences it is of the essence of what it is to "truly experience" sailing, then the blind man never really experiences it in its essence. Perhaps belief in God is the same: unless you can experience it <I>from the inside</I>, as it were, then you're still just, well, doing philosophy of language--playing language games. That was how I myself viewed religion for a long time, rather like a hobby. Here are some beliefs, here is the magisterium, here is some history, here are some texts--all are very cool, interesting, stimulating, moving even but, in the end, it's just a game. I made the move "to the inside" when I abandoned my very self to God's will (not that I ever actually do it, mind you--that's still pretty hard, maybe even beyond my capacity). There is a stage of assent that is not strictly cognitive in nature, and that is what is required before one can <I>really</I> "see" the "color" of religious belief.Vitae Scrutatorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12808120163472036743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14247942.post-1127187242489673042005-09-19T23:34:00.000-04:002005-09-19T23:34:00.000-04:00I think I agree with virtually everything you've w...I think I agree with virtually everything you've written here. At least, the metaphysical position you outline is the kind of position that I <I>want</I> to be able to articulate and defend. I have some questions though, and you seem to be uniquely qualified to address them, given your interests and expertise.<BR/><BR/>1. What kind of threat does nominalism pose to positions of the sort you describe? Clearly, if nominalism were true, it would be false to talk about natural kinds and species and the like as though they were significant in themselves. Question is, I suppose, what in particular do you think about the case for nominalism, both as a position in the philosophy of language and especially in the philosophy of biology? <BR/><BR/>2. To what extent do you think that your position about humans as parts of the natural world can be analyzed into two distinct propositions, i.e., 1) that human beings are neither above nature nor 'merely' natural in a reductively materialist way; 2) the <I>super</I>natural exists in additon to the natural. I'm asking, I guess, to what extent you think that the <I>super</I>natural needs to be invoked to explain how it is that human beings both are a part of nature but are not 'mere' nature. Do we do better to explain human beings as 'mere' nature endowed with elements of supernature, or to avoid interpreting nature as 'mere' nature in the first place? <BR/><BR/>3) Do you really think that non-believers are like people who have been born blind? Aside from the obviously shaky analogy between a faculty of sense and (a capacity for?) a (formalized?)belief, that view would suggest not simply that such people <I>can not</I> see what you see, but that they <I>will never be able</I> to see what you see. If that is really what you mean, then you seem excessively pessimistic about people's spiritual capacities and excessively anti-intellectual about the capacity of reason to communicate elements of the faith. Of course, as one who qualifies as a 'non-believer' myself (sympathetic agnostics still count as such, I suppose), I may simply have been born blind (more likely, my blindness was inflicted). But that wouldn't prevent me from being able to adequately address your reasoning about the things that you can see, even though I can not see them. After all, the blind could in fact sail, even if he couldn't experience it in the same way.djrhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07752946730851928276noreply@blogger.com