Meandering thoughts about life, philosophy, science, religion, morality, politics, history, Greek and Latin literature, and whatever else I can think about to avoid doing any real work.
Saturday, October 13, 2007
Ouch!
This one, I'm afraid, is going to leave a mark. As usual, Mike Liccione has hit one right out of the stadium while the bases were already loaded. Good job.
Friday, October 12, 2007
Thy Will Be Done
Tom Gnau has been wrestling with me in the combox to my recent post on prayer. In that post, I characterized certain forms of petitionary prayer as simplistic and naive, going so far as to call it "magical thinking". I knew when I wrote that post that some people would be offended by it, and Tom, while he may not exactly be offended, is at the very least a little grumpy about it, since he seems to like precisely the sort of petitionary prayer I was rejecting. His comments prompt me to say something more, if only to clarify my own position and make sure that I offend as many people as humanly possible. But, in all seriousness, I am not claiming that my view is either the most orthodox, the most rational, or the most psychologically appealing. It is simply my view, and it doesn't have much else going for it other than that I have thought about it long and hard and have a few things I can point to in its support, and I am very happy to hear what others think about it, especially those who don't accept it; I would be particularly interested to hear what my regular Protestant readers think of it, though I have no illusions that they will be the only ones who don't like it.
Let me start by quoting from Tom's most recent comment, to "set the stage", as it were, for my further comments.
OK, so that's my distinction: I think that it's irrelevant that the Pope thinks that the petition "give us this day our daily bread" is about the Eucharist or that it's acceptable in his view to read it as a request for food. It's irrelevant because he's simply stating views that are acceptable to hold, not view that must be held de fide, and, more importantly, he is not excluding any particular views by supporting the ones that he does. Typically, when the Church has something definitive or authoritative to say about matters of faith and morals, she does so by means of the via negativa, i.e., condemnation of error, not mandating of any particular view. The decrees of Ecumenical Councils, for example, typically consist of anathemas, not positive decrees of what must be believed (though of course one does find that as well). So it's important that in saying what he thinks the petition is about he does not say anything about what it is definitively not about. In particular, he does not say that the petition is not about asking the Lord Our God to be our only source of spiritual sustenance.
Now, to the more general question: what's wrong, exactly, with seeing the petitions found in the New Testament as straightforward petitions in the simplistic, naive, magical-thinking sense that I don't like? Tom's prime example, mentioned in a different comment of his, was that of Our Lord in the garden of Gethsemane. How could those petitions not be taken literally? Clearly, he said, Our Lord wanted that Cup taken away, but He added the proviso "thy will be done" (thus saving himself the embarrassment of asking for something that he already knew was not the Father's will, I suppose).
Frankly I can think of no worse way to understand Our Lord's prayer in the garden. If Jesus had really been asking for that Cup to be taken away, that would suggest that he did not understand either the purpose of his own mission or the normative criterion of redemptive suffering in the order of the kosmos. Given that we are to believe that Christ's will was perfectly conformed to the will of the Father, it seems virtually heretical to think that he genuinely willed that the Cup be taken away, though deferring to the Father's will in the final analysis. Consider two different people, each trying to conform their will to the will of a third party. Let's call the normative will, the will to which they are trying to conform, will A, and the two other wills we may call will B and will C. Agent B reasons this way about his will, will B: "I do not want what will A intends, and I do know what will A intends and I actively will something else to occur, but if will A obtains its object I will acquiesce in it." Agent C reasons this way about his will: "I know exactly what will A intends, and I, with will C, intend the exact same thing." Both will B and will C can be said to be "conforming" to an extent with will A insofar as both B and C are content to have will A obtain its object, but clearly will C is more closely conformed to will A than is will B. And given that Christ's will is to be believed to be perfectly conformed to the Father's will, it seems to me that Christ must have willed something like what will C has willed. In short, his petition was not literally that God take the Cup away, it was something else. But what?
My own view is that much of what we find written in the New Testament, but particularly the Gospel accounts, is intended to represent something rather deeper than what we find at the surface. In the case of Our Lord's prayer, for example, it seems rather clear to me that we have little reason to take it as literally as some folks have been tempted to do, and this for two reasons. First, if we were to take it literally, it would raise the question of how the story came to be embedded in the Apostolic tradition in the first place, seeing as how Our Lord was alone in the garden, and Peter, James, and John are represented as being asleep during the prayer. It seems unlikely that Our Lord told them about his prayers on their way back to town, since the Gospels frequently emphasize his wont to remove himself to a very private place for prayer, and his own advice to folks was to go into their rooms alone and pray. In short, Our Lord seems to have frowned on the practice of letting others in on the content of your private conversations with God. Possible we are to imagine one of the three disciples really being awake the whole time and listening in, but that just raises more problems than it settles, since it would not make that particular disciple look too good, and it's also obviously a rather ad hoc explanation. Second, the account of Our Lord's final hours in the Gospel of John portray his affect very differently. He is not afraid of dying there, indeed in the High Priestly Prayer he makes it very clear that he knows exactly what is going to happen, he knows that it is for the best, and he knows that it is the will of the Father, and he is perfectly jiggy with going through with the whole thing. There is no trace of the sweating of blood in chapter 18 of that Gospel, and if there were, it would ring very hollow, following so closely upon the triumphalism of the High Priestly Prayer. I think, therefore, that when Christ is made to pray in the Synoptics that the Cup be taken away, we are not to see it as a literal request by Jesus that the course of history be altered, or that God find some other, less painful way, to accomplish his will for mankind. That would make Our Lord very craven indeed. Instead, I think, it is preferable to see in Our Lord's petition a desire on the part of Jesus of Nazareth to draw ever closer to his heavenly Father, to feel his presence at a time when human nature is most likely to overlook the presence that is, in fact, ever-present. It is, in short, a model for us, not a petition of his, it is a paradeigma, a way of illustrating by way of example the sort of relationship that the Father most desires in his creatures: we are week, we have desires, but when those desires distract us from God's presence, we ought to offer them up by admitting that we have them, admitting our weakness, but we do this not because we want God to satisfy some desire that is itself a manifestation of that weakness, but because we want God to draw closer to us, to replace that desire that comes from that weakness with an abandonment of self to his most holy will, and that is why the "proviso", the "thy will be done", is not a proviso at all but the most essential element of the entire petition.
Regarding the Lord's Prayer, I certainly do not disagree that it is, indeed, literally filled with petitions. But again, my own view is that when Our Lord gave this form of prayer to his disciples, he was not telling them anything at all like "You have things you want? Go ahead and ask for them! Just do it this way!" In my opinion, every one of the petitions in the Lord's Prayer not only can be, but ought to be, interpreted not as a straightforward asking for something, begging the Father to fulfill some earthly desire, but as spiritual requests, petitions for varying aspects of our relationship with the Father to be made manifest in our lives. Because I have this attitude towards petitionary prayer, I am particularly put off by the so-called "prosperity Christians", who ask God for whatever they want and interpret getting what they want as proof that God is listening to and answering their prayers. In their view, the story about the woman pounding on the judge's door at night asking for a hearing is to be taken as practical advice: if you pester God long enough, he will give you what you want just to shut you up. Same with the bit about "ask, and you shall receive, knock, and it shall be opened up to you"--these are all about getting what we want, as far as those folks are concerned. But our relationship with God isn't about getting what we want, it's about wanting what we get, since what we get is either what we need or what we deserve, or else it's just random, in which case it would be well for us to accept it with a certain equanimity. Even in the case of physical suffering, when we pray for an end to pain, whether physical or emotional, my view is that what we are really praying for is God's comfort in the form of closeness to him, a greater awareness of his presence in our lives. We often confuse that desire with a desire for an end to the physical suffering, but we're Christians, people: we don't think that physical suffering means anything in the face of spiritual life! Sickness and death, physical pain, etc., these things are all natural, in a way: part of the physical, material world, they are byproducts of natural forces. But they are also signs of something else, of our separation from God. When we pray for an end to physical pain, it's the animal in us that really wants nothing more than an end to physical pain. The Christian soul in us is really saying, I want to restore a right relationship with my Father. This is true, I think, even when we do not believe that it is true. It is what prayer really is, whether we understand that fact or not.
The Gospel accounts are filled with miracle stories in which Our Lord asks someone, "What do you want me to do for you?" And the person says something like "I want to see" or "I want to walk". Even these stories, in my view, are not about getting something specific from God. Because here again, the disabilities in these stories are not disabilities, but signs of our sinful state. When the person says "I want to see" what he really means is "I want to be free from sin", and Jesus gives that to him under the sacramental sign of the healing of his disability. It's very important, in my opinion, to keep the deep symbolism of the Gospel accounts in mind at all times. This does not mean that I don't think that these miracles "really happened", or that they happened in some ordinary way. I think they really happened, just as the Gospel stories describe them as happening. But I don't think that they mean what a straightforward reading of the text would ordinarily mean. When Our Lord walked the earth, everything that happened had two meanings: the literal meaning, which is unimportant, and the hidden meaning, the theological meaning, which is everything. For Christians, the world is still like that to a certain extent--shot through with meaning in every existing thing--but it will never be quite the same as it was when God was incarnate and walked among us. At that time, when God became Man, Man himself became a sign of something else, and perceptible creation was itself sacramentally used by the GodMan as a bearer of his message. For this reason, I believe that we cannot read the Gospel accounts in a simple and straightforward way; I believe it is necessary to always look beneath the surface, at the historical context, sure, but also at the theological context. The early Fathers read the texts this way as well, and it has harmed us that their approach to these texts was superseded by a dull and banal literalism that lacked imagination and wonder.
So my view is that every prayer, of every sort, no matter what words we say, no matter what semantic content we impute to them, is really just a variation on the theme "thy will be done". We express this theme in very many ways, obviously, and I don't deny that we all ask for very specific things in our prayers from time to time. The Church herself puts very specific petitions into her liturgical prayer, but these, too, I claim, are simply different ways of making explicit the same inner desire: closeness to God. We don't know what the Beatific Vision will be like, obviously, so we try different ways of expressing our inner longing for that one, unified moment, in which we will behold him face to face, when we will have no more desires and no need for petitionary prayer. In a way, petitionary prayer is just practicing for that moment: trying to find some modicum of awareness in this mode of existence of what that mode of existence will be like. Clearly we can get no closer than analogical being, but to the extent that we pray at all times, without ceasing, in every manner that is available to us, we strive for what is, after all, our highest end.
Let me start by quoting from Tom's most recent comment, to "set the stage", as it were, for my further comments.
Speaking of the Lord's Prayer...that prayer readily chips away at your idea that petitionary prayer is somehow "naive," silly or in any way out of court. That prayer is chock full of petitions. "Give us this day our daily bread ..." is best seen in light of the Holy Eucharist, without a doubt. But even Pope Benedict XVI has said that petition can be read and offered in more prosaic ways, as indeed it has for all of Christian history.I would like to begin by drawing a distinction--again, a distinction that I am sure will not be to everyone's liking--between what is permitted, what is preferable, and what is necessary. I have no doubt that Pope Benedict is quite right that, for many, many generations now, countless Christians have offered up the petitions in the Lord's Prayer in a very literal way. Clearly, that way of "reading" the Lord's Prayer is permitted, that is, it is not crazy or heretical or stupid to understand the Lord's Prayer as a set of petitions on the order of asking for a good parking place at the mall. By the same token, it is clearly not necessary to see the petition "Give us this day our daily bread" either as a request for food, a request to enable one to participate more actively and fully in the Mass, or even in the way that I would suggest we read it, as a petition for the Lord Our God to be our only source of spiritual sustenance. The question is not whether any of these readings are either permitted or necessary, but whether any one of them is preferable to any other. My own view is that they are all permitted, none is necessary, and one is preferable.
My argument here is not that we offer good or commendable petitions. What may arrest our minds and hearts at any moment is all too often trivial, unfortunately. And it is better to intercede for others (a type of petition, no?), to praise, to thank, to seek to glorify, to seek to serve.
My argument is simply that Jesus himself in effect paved the way for our petitions.
OK, so that's my distinction: I think that it's irrelevant that the Pope thinks that the petition "give us this day our daily bread" is about the Eucharist or that it's acceptable in his view to read it as a request for food. It's irrelevant because he's simply stating views that are acceptable to hold, not view that must be held de fide, and, more importantly, he is not excluding any particular views by supporting the ones that he does. Typically, when the Church has something definitive or authoritative to say about matters of faith and morals, she does so by means of the via negativa, i.e., condemnation of error, not mandating of any particular view. The decrees of Ecumenical Councils, for example, typically consist of anathemas, not positive decrees of what must be believed (though of course one does find that as well). So it's important that in saying what he thinks the petition is about he does not say anything about what it is definitively not about. In particular, he does not say that the petition is not about asking the Lord Our God to be our only source of spiritual sustenance.
Now, to the more general question: what's wrong, exactly, with seeing the petitions found in the New Testament as straightforward petitions in the simplistic, naive, magical-thinking sense that I don't like? Tom's prime example, mentioned in a different comment of his, was that of Our Lord in the garden of Gethsemane. How could those petitions not be taken literally? Clearly, he said, Our Lord wanted that Cup taken away, but He added the proviso "thy will be done" (thus saving himself the embarrassment of asking for something that he already knew was not the Father's will, I suppose).
Frankly I can think of no worse way to understand Our Lord's prayer in the garden. If Jesus had really been asking for that Cup to be taken away, that would suggest that he did not understand either the purpose of his own mission or the normative criterion of redemptive suffering in the order of the kosmos. Given that we are to believe that Christ's will was perfectly conformed to the will of the Father, it seems virtually heretical to think that he genuinely willed that the Cup be taken away, though deferring to the Father's will in the final analysis. Consider two different people, each trying to conform their will to the will of a third party. Let's call the normative will, the will to which they are trying to conform, will A, and the two other wills we may call will B and will C. Agent B reasons this way about his will, will B: "I do not want what will A intends, and I do know what will A intends and I actively will something else to occur, but if will A obtains its object I will acquiesce in it." Agent C reasons this way about his will: "I know exactly what will A intends, and I, with will C, intend the exact same thing." Both will B and will C can be said to be "conforming" to an extent with will A insofar as both B and C are content to have will A obtain its object, but clearly will C is more closely conformed to will A than is will B. And given that Christ's will is to be believed to be perfectly conformed to the Father's will, it seems to me that Christ must have willed something like what will C has willed. In short, his petition was not literally that God take the Cup away, it was something else. But what?
My own view is that much of what we find written in the New Testament, but particularly the Gospel accounts, is intended to represent something rather deeper than what we find at the surface. In the case of Our Lord's prayer, for example, it seems rather clear to me that we have little reason to take it as literally as some folks have been tempted to do, and this for two reasons. First, if we were to take it literally, it would raise the question of how the story came to be embedded in the Apostolic tradition in the first place, seeing as how Our Lord was alone in the garden, and Peter, James, and John are represented as being asleep during the prayer. It seems unlikely that Our Lord told them about his prayers on their way back to town, since the Gospels frequently emphasize his wont to remove himself to a very private place for prayer, and his own advice to folks was to go into their rooms alone and pray. In short, Our Lord seems to have frowned on the practice of letting others in on the content of your private conversations with God. Possible we are to imagine one of the three disciples really being awake the whole time and listening in, but that just raises more problems than it settles, since it would not make that particular disciple look too good, and it's also obviously a rather ad hoc explanation. Second, the account of Our Lord's final hours in the Gospel of John portray his affect very differently. He is not afraid of dying there, indeed in the High Priestly Prayer he makes it very clear that he knows exactly what is going to happen, he knows that it is for the best, and he knows that it is the will of the Father, and he is perfectly jiggy with going through with the whole thing. There is no trace of the sweating of blood in chapter 18 of that Gospel, and if there were, it would ring very hollow, following so closely upon the triumphalism of the High Priestly Prayer. I think, therefore, that when Christ is made to pray in the Synoptics that the Cup be taken away, we are not to see it as a literal request by Jesus that the course of history be altered, or that God find some other, less painful way, to accomplish his will for mankind. That would make Our Lord very craven indeed. Instead, I think, it is preferable to see in Our Lord's petition a desire on the part of Jesus of Nazareth to draw ever closer to his heavenly Father, to feel his presence at a time when human nature is most likely to overlook the presence that is, in fact, ever-present. It is, in short, a model for us, not a petition of his, it is a paradeigma, a way of illustrating by way of example the sort of relationship that the Father most desires in his creatures: we are week, we have desires, but when those desires distract us from God's presence, we ought to offer them up by admitting that we have them, admitting our weakness, but we do this not because we want God to satisfy some desire that is itself a manifestation of that weakness, but because we want God to draw closer to us, to replace that desire that comes from that weakness with an abandonment of self to his most holy will, and that is why the "proviso", the "thy will be done", is not a proviso at all but the most essential element of the entire petition.
Regarding the Lord's Prayer, I certainly do not disagree that it is, indeed, literally filled with petitions. But again, my own view is that when Our Lord gave this form of prayer to his disciples, he was not telling them anything at all like "You have things you want? Go ahead and ask for them! Just do it this way!" In my opinion, every one of the petitions in the Lord's Prayer not only can be, but ought to be, interpreted not as a straightforward asking for something, begging the Father to fulfill some earthly desire, but as spiritual requests, petitions for varying aspects of our relationship with the Father to be made manifest in our lives. Because I have this attitude towards petitionary prayer, I am particularly put off by the so-called "prosperity Christians", who ask God for whatever they want and interpret getting what they want as proof that God is listening to and answering their prayers. In their view, the story about the woman pounding on the judge's door at night asking for a hearing is to be taken as practical advice: if you pester God long enough, he will give you what you want just to shut you up. Same with the bit about "ask, and you shall receive, knock, and it shall be opened up to you"--these are all about getting what we want, as far as those folks are concerned. But our relationship with God isn't about getting what we want, it's about wanting what we get, since what we get is either what we need or what we deserve, or else it's just random, in which case it would be well for us to accept it with a certain equanimity. Even in the case of physical suffering, when we pray for an end to pain, whether physical or emotional, my view is that what we are really praying for is God's comfort in the form of closeness to him, a greater awareness of his presence in our lives. We often confuse that desire with a desire for an end to the physical suffering, but we're Christians, people: we don't think that physical suffering means anything in the face of spiritual life! Sickness and death, physical pain, etc., these things are all natural, in a way: part of the physical, material world, they are byproducts of natural forces. But they are also signs of something else, of our separation from God. When we pray for an end to physical pain, it's the animal in us that really wants nothing more than an end to physical pain. The Christian soul in us is really saying, I want to restore a right relationship with my Father. This is true, I think, even when we do not believe that it is true. It is what prayer really is, whether we understand that fact or not.
The Gospel accounts are filled with miracle stories in which Our Lord asks someone, "What do you want me to do for you?" And the person says something like "I want to see" or "I want to walk". Even these stories, in my view, are not about getting something specific from God. Because here again, the disabilities in these stories are not disabilities, but signs of our sinful state. When the person says "I want to see" what he really means is "I want to be free from sin", and Jesus gives that to him under the sacramental sign of the healing of his disability. It's very important, in my opinion, to keep the deep symbolism of the Gospel accounts in mind at all times. This does not mean that I don't think that these miracles "really happened", or that they happened in some ordinary way. I think they really happened, just as the Gospel stories describe them as happening. But I don't think that they mean what a straightforward reading of the text would ordinarily mean. When Our Lord walked the earth, everything that happened had two meanings: the literal meaning, which is unimportant, and the hidden meaning, the theological meaning, which is everything. For Christians, the world is still like that to a certain extent--shot through with meaning in every existing thing--but it will never be quite the same as it was when God was incarnate and walked among us. At that time, when God became Man, Man himself became a sign of something else, and perceptible creation was itself sacramentally used by the GodMan as a bearer of his message. For this reason, I believe that we cannot read the Gospel accounts in a simple and straightforward way; I believe it is necessary to always look beneath the surface, at the historical context, sure, but also at the theological context. The early Fathers read the texts this way as well, and it has harmed us that their approach to these texts was superseded by a dull and banal literalism that lacked imagination and wonder.
So my view is that every prayer, of every sort, no matter what words we say, no matter what semantic content we impute to them, is really just a variation on the theme "thy will be done". We express this theme in very many ways, obviously, and I don't deny that we all ask for very specific things in our prayers from time to time. The Church herself puts very specific petitions into her liturgical prayer, but these, too, I claim, are simply different ways of making explicit the same inner desire: closeness to God. We don't know what the Beatific Vision will be like, obviously, so we try different ways of expressing our inner longing for that one, unified moment, in which we will behold him face to face, when we will have no more desires and no need for petitionary prayer. In a way, petitionary prayer is just practicing for that moment: trying to find some modicum of awareness in this mode of existence of what that mode of existence will be like. Clearly we can get no closer than analogical being, but to the extent that we pray at all times, without ceasing, in every manner that is available to us, we strive for what is, after all, our highest end.
Trusting in One's Own Meaningfulness
Although I try to make it a point to read Jonathan Prejean's excellent blog, the CrimsonCatholic, every day, I owe a hat tip to Fr. Al Kimel for drawing my attention to the most recent post over there, on the question "Is the Protestant concept of authority vicious?". Although Jonathan does not raise the question himself, he answers it very well. I will pass over the rather worrisome project of trying to characterize particular religious beliefs as either virtuous or vicious (a project that is, again, not Jonathan's but another's), since I cannot make any sense out of it. But I will say that Jonathan does a good job of raising an important question: what exactly is the epistemic relationship between our cognitive faculties and the content of our faith? John Paul II, famously, blogged on this very topic, here. A question that I have put a number of times, but to which I have never received any answer, let alone a compelling one, is relevant here: how can an individual, relying on his private judgment, discern the difference between orthodoxy and heresy during the years A.D. 33-50? For that matter, given some discussion I have seen in my comboxes, I also wonder how some folks would answer that question for any period in the Christian era, let alone the earliest. It could be that the folks to whom I have posed this question simply do not see its importance, and for that reason they have not bothered to answer it, thinking that they have bigger fish to fry; but it is difficult to tell, since I have heard nary a peep on this topic since first posing the question.
That is is, in fact, the central question in the debate at hand, however, is obvious. Without a normative criterion that is external to the individual believer, there is literally no means at all for determining whether a particular teaching is true or false. If, on the one hand, you should happen to believe that your own private judgment is as good as anyone else's, then you have reason to believe, perhaps, that others are as likely to screw up as you yourself are, but you have as yet no principle for distinguishing between true and false judgments. If, on the other hand, you should happen to believe that your own private judgment is better, at least in principle, than any other external judgment, on the grounds that your private judgments are aided by the direction of the Holy Spirit, pick up your phone and call Elvis right away, he needs you in his band.
Granted, if it were really the case that some particular individual really did have a private line to the Holy Spirit, that would presumably be a big help in deciding whether to endorse certain teachings rather than others. But the question remains: according to what criterion are we to judge the truth or falsity of the judgment that we are genuinely guided by the Holy Spirit in our private judgments? There is a very real danger of vicious circularity here.
Does the same danger exist for those who defer authoritativeness to judgments made by institutions outside of themselves? Clearly not. We may begin, perhaps, by noting that there is already a rather interesting substantive difference between someone who thinks of himself as the source of authority (albeit, with the help of the Holy Spirit), and someone who thinks of some institution as the source of authority (also with the help of the Holy Spirit). Since the names for that difference aren't always pretty, I'll simply point out that the danger of circularity is not present here because when the source of authoritativeness is within oneself, it will never be the case that you find yourself thinking the following:
That is is, in fact, the central question in the debate at hand, however, is obvious. Without a normative criterion that is external to the individual believer, there is literally no means at all for determining whether a particular teaching is true or false. If, on the one hand, you should happen to believe that your own private judgment is as good as anyone else's, then you have reason to believe, perhaps, that others are as likely to screw up as you yourself are, but you have as yet no principle for distinguishing between true and false judgments. If, on the other hand, you should happen to believe that your own private judgment is better, at least in principle, than any other external judgment, on the grounds that your private judgments are aided by the direction of the Holy Spirit, pick up your phone and call Elvis right away, he needs you in his band.
Granted, if it were really the case that some particular individual really did have a private line to the Holy Spirit, that would presumably be a big help in deciding whether to endorse certain teachings rather than others. But the question remains: according to what criterion are we to judge the truth or falsity of the judgment that we are genuinely guided by the Holy Spirit in our private judgments? There is a very real danger of vicious circularity here.
Does the same danger exist for those who defer authoritativeness to judgments made by institutions outside of themselves? Clearly not. We may begin, perhaps, by noting that there is already a rather interesting substantive difference between someone who thinks of himself as the source of authority (albeit, with the help of the Holy Spirit), and someone who thinks of some institution as the source of authority (also with the help of the Holy Spirit). Since the names for that difference aren't always pretty, I'll simply point out that the danger of circularity is not present here because when the source of authoritativeness is within oneself, it will never be the case that you find yourself thinking the following:
I do not believe X, and yet I must, and do, believe X because my inner source of authoritativeness with respect to belief compels me to..When the source of authoritativeness is external to oneself, it becomes possible to wonder whether what is taught authoritatively must be believed, and pretty much for precisely the reasons that some Protestants reject the authority of the Church qua institution: they claim that they not only don't know for sure that the Church is teaching authoritatively, they go so far as to claim that they know it to be teaching what is false. A Catholic may say, "I know X to be true because the Church teaches it authoritatively", and in this sense the Catholic and the Protestant say the same thing, except that where the Catholic says "Church" the Protestant says "I and my inner source of authority". But a Catholic may also say "I find it very difficult to believe X, but the Church teaches it authoritatively and so I will submit my will to hers and give intellectual assent to it anyway." No Protestant can say this, even if he swaps out the word "Church" and replaces it with "I and my inner source of authority". If he leaves the word "Church" in, obviously, he fails to make any sense qua Protestant. If he swaps it out for the suggested replacement, he fails to make any sense qua epistemic agent. It is precisely because he believes X that he believes it to be authoritatively true, so it is simply not the case that he finds it difficult to accept; indeed, he fools himself if he thinks it true that he really finds it difficult to accept, for he has in fact already accepted it, and that is precisely why he says that he gives his assent to it. So the Protestant, in making any kind of claim about authority, must say something that is meaningless in one way or another.
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Christians and Scientific Realism
When I was in graduate school I took a very interesting seminar taught by James Van Cleve (who was on loan to Duke from Brown University at the time--now he's at USC) called "Realism and Anti-Realism". Virtually all of the readings were anti-realist in their orientation, and one of the students asked why the syllabus had such an anti-realist slant to it. Van Cleve answered "I just assumed that most people were probably already realists, and would be less familiar with the anti-realist literature." That turned out to be an accurate assessment, and the course was one of the most interesting I took at Duke principally because I found a great many of my own a priori metaphysical assumptions being challenged on every front.
That was fifteen years ago, at a time when many of my deeply held convictions were coming under heavy fire not only in my coursework, but from within my own conscience as well. In particular, I was struggling with the task of making sense out of my religious faith in the face of what Bas Van Fraassen has called "the scientific image" of man. As it happens, it was an encounter with Bas Van Fraassen's anti-realist philosophy of science that helped me through this rather difficult period. It occurred to me that a believing Christian (as opposed to the mind-numbingly banal "Christian" Owen Flanagan recommends being) could not possibly accept scientific realism, and Van Fraassen's work introduced me to a rather large body of literature that demonstrated that going anti-realist is a good idea for many other reasons as well.
We may define scientific realism in roughly this way: the task of science is to describe the operations of nature as they really are, on the assumption that representations of nature in the form of scientific hypotheses, formulae, theorems, etc., are literally true or false to the extent that they accurately representing nature. Anti-realism about science can take many forms, but the form that I defend is not particularly complex, it is merely the denial of this form of scientific realism. In particular, the anti-realism that I defend is simply the denial that scientific hypotheses, formulae, theorems, etc., can be literally true or false. Truth and falsity are, of course, rather important norms, but for the anti-realism that I defend a more important norm is usefulness.
To see what I mean, consider three different maps. Map (A) is a satellite photograph of the earth's surface such as you might find using Google Earth, only without any street overlays, place names, etc.: just the photograph of the ground. Map (B) is a road map of the sort you might purchase at the local gas station. Map (C) is a line drawing that I make to show you how to get from uptown Athens to my house. Now, in terms of "accuracy of representation" I think that it is arguable that there is a continuum here from "most accurate" to "least accurate", with map (A) being the "most accurate" to map (C) being the "least accurate". On a "realist" account of mapping, the satellite photograph will be the best, since it is the "truest" in the sense of being the most accurate representation of what's on the ground. But if you've ever used Google Earth to get somewhere without turning on the street overlays, you know that it's almost useless. You need to know street names, directions, distances, etc. So map (B) is far more useful than map (A). And if you have a specific sort of trip in mind, such as trying to get to my house from uptown Athens, then map (C) will be even more useful, since it has been designed to do precisely what you need to do, i.e., get yourself to my house from uptown Athens. So, which map do you want? Well, it sort of depends on what you want the map for. If, like me, you sort of enjoy looking at satellite photographs of the earth, I suppose map (A) will suit you, but most people want maps to get places, and so maps (B) and (C) are superior to map (A), even though they are less true in the sense of being less directly representational. They are, of course, representations, but they are not representations in the sense of being "literally true" in the realist's sense.
So the anti-realist favors usefulness over truth, but what could this mean in the domain of science? Isn't a scientific theory useful precisely to the extent that it's true? This is, in fact, a version of an argument that realists make all the time. They say that scientific realism must be true, because science is so successful. If science did not accurately represent reality, they say, there would be no way for science to be as successful as it is, because the only way for science to be successful is for it to "get things right" about the external world. Hence, to the extent that "science works", it is also literally true.
Now, it seems to me that even a moron could see that this is a circular argument, and yet realists make it all the time. Indeed, it seems as though the anti-realist would have a perfectly simple rejoinder to this kind of argument: if scientific realism is true, then the history of science along with the hypothetico-deductive model of theory formation teach us that all of our scientific theories are always false, regardless of how useful we may find them to be at one time or another. I don't actually want to get into that particular problem, though, because for the Christian that whole issue is academic. Scientific realism also presupposes both global materialism and global empiricism, and the Christian must reject both. Global materialism is false for the Christian because the Christian believes that there is at least one non-material being, namely God. Global empiricism is false because the Christian believes that it is possible to have knowledge of a non-perceptible entity, namely God. Christians, of course, can be scientists, since they may quite easily adopt both local materialism and local empiricism (that is, materialism and empiricism when doing science) without violating the principles of their Christian belief.
So the Christian is interested only in scientific theories that are useful, and is not interested in whether or not they are true (mostly they will have to be regarded as false for one reason or another anyway, so why even get into that whole problem?). Consider the difference between the heliocentric and the geocentric models of the solar system. Both of them have been "useful" at one time or another, though at present we believe that one of them is false. Some would like to believe that the other one is true, but of course that presupposes that because the other one works better that it is also truer. It may turn out to be the case that the heliocentric model will need to be modified as more data are collected, thus showing the present version of it to be false. This is perhaps unlikely, but a genuine scientist cannot rule out the possibility that his present hypothesis is false, otherwise science could never move forward, it could never take into account new data. Rather than say, "this model is false" the Christian says "whether or not this theory is true or false, it's the one that I can use right now to make these predictions or to accomplish these goals." One of the things that led to the abandonment of the geocentric model in favor of the heliocentric was precisely this: one model was more useful than the other. It's not that there were new data available--there weren't. Both models can make a certain amount of sense of the observational data. What's more important than that is that the heliocentric model enables us to do more given the other theories that we also accept. Hence the criterion is not truth (since on that criterion we could never finally accept any theory), but usefulness.
Looking at science in this way enables the Christian to accept a theory like evolution even when many defenders of evolution claim that accepting it means rejecting religious belief. That would only be the case if two conditions were met: (a) evolutionary theory logically excludes the truth of any religion and (b) scientific realism is true. Since both (a) and (b) are false, and since evolutionary theory is very useful in explaining the origins and development of life, the Christian not only can but ought to accept evolutionary theory.
That was fifteen years ago, at a time when many of my deeply held convictions were coming under heavy fire not only in my coursework, but from within my own conscience as well. In particular, I was struggling with the task of making sense out of my religious faith in the face of what Bas Van Fraassen has called "the scientific image" of man. As it happens, it was an encounter with Bas Van Fraassen's anti-realist philosophy of science that helped me through this rather difficult period. It occurred to me that a believing Christian (as opposed to the mind-numbingly banal "Christian" Owen Flanagan recommends being) could not possibly accept scientific realism, and Van Fraassen's work introduced me to a rather large body of literature that demonstrated that going anti-realist is a good idea for many other reasons as well.
We may define scientific realism in roughly this way: the task of science is to describe the operations of nature as they really are, on the assumption that representations of nature in the form of scientific hypotheses, formulae, theorems, etc., are literally true or false to the extent that they accurately representing nature. Anti-realism about science can take many forms, but the form that I defend is not particularly complex, it is merely the denial of this form of scientific realism. In particular, the anti-realism that I defend is simply the denial that scientific hypotheses, formulae, theorems, etc., can be literally true or false. Truth and falsity are, of course, rather important norms, but for the anti-realism that I defend a more important norm is usefulness.
To see what I mean, consider three different maps. Map (A) is a satellite photograph of the earth's surface such as you might find using Google Earth, only without any street overlays, place names, etc.: just the photograph of the ground. Map (B) is a road map of the sort you might purchase at the local gas station. Map (C) is a line drawing that I make to show you how to get from uptown Athens to my house. Now, in terms of "accuracy of representation" I think that it is arguable that there is a continuum here from "most accurate" to "least accurate", with map (A) being the "most accurate" to map (C) being the "least accurate". On a "realist" account of mapping, the satellite photograph will be the best, since it is the "truest" in the sense of being the most accurate representation of what's on the ground. But if you've ever used Google Earth to get somewhere without turning on the street overlays, you know that it's almost useless. You need to know street names, directions, distances, etc. So map (B) is far more useful than map (A). And if you have a specific sort of trip in mind, such as trying to get to my house from uptown Athens, then map (C) will be even more useful, since it has been designed to do precisely what you need to do, i.e., get yourself to my house from uptown Athens. So, which map do you want? Well, it sort of depends on what you want the map for. If, like me, you sort of enjoy looking at satellite photographs of the earth, I suppose map (A) will suit you, but most people want maps to get places, and so maps (B) and (C) are superior to map (A), even though they are less true in the sense of being less directly representational. They are, of course, representations, but they are not representations in the sense of being "literally true" in the realist's sense.
So the anti-realist favors usefulness over truth, but what could this mean in the domain of science? Isn't a scientific theory useful precisely to the extent that it's true? This is, in fact, a version of an argument that realists make all the time. They say that scientific realism must be true, because science is so successful. If science did not accurately represent reality, they say, there would be no way for science to be as successful as it is, because the only way for science to be successful is for it to "get things right" about the external world. Hence, to the extent that "science works", it is also literally true.
Now, it seems to me that even a moron could see that this is a circular argument, and yet realists make it all the time. Indeed, it seems as though the anti-realist would have a perfectly simple rejoinder to this kind of argument: if scientific realism is true, then the history of science along with the hypothetico-deductive model of theory formation teach us that all of our scientific theories are always false, regardless of how useful we may find them to be at one time or another. I don't actually want to get into that particular problem, though, because for the Christian that whole issue is academic. Scientific realism also presupposes both global materialism and global empiricism, and the Christian must reject both. Global materialism is false for the Christian because the Christian believes that there is at least one non-material being, namely God. Global empiricism is false because the Christian believes that it is possible to have knowledge of a non-perceptible entity, namely God. Christians, of course, can be scientists, since they may quite easily adopt both local materialism and local empiricism (that is, materialism and empiricism when doing science) without violating the principles of their Christian belief.
So the Christian is interested only in scientific theories that are useful, and is not interested in whether or not they are true (mostly they will have to be regarded as false for one reason or another anyway, so why even get into that whole problem?). Consider the difference between the heliocentric and the geocentric models of the solar system. Both of them have been "useful" at one time or another, though at present we believe that one of them is false. Some would like to believe that the other one is true, but of course that presupposes that because the other one works better that it is also truer. It may turn out to be the case that the heliocentric model will need to be modified as more data are collected, thus showing the present version of it to be false. This is perhaps unlikely, but a genuine scientist cannot rule out the possibility that his present hypothesis is false, otherwise science could never move forward, it could never take into account new data. Rather than say, "this model is false" the Christian says "whether or not this theory is true or false, it's the one that I can use right now to make these predictions or to accomplish these goals." One of the things that led to the abandonment of the geocentric model in favor of the heliocentric was precisely this: one model was more useful than the other. It's not that there were new data available--there weren't. Both models can make a certain amount of sense of the observational data. What's more important than that is that the heliocentric model enables us to do more given the other theories that we also accept. Hence the criterion is not truth (since on that criterion we could never finally accept any theory), but usefulness.
Looking at science in this way enables the Christian to accept a theory like evolution even when many defenders of evolution claim that accepting it means rejecting religious belief. That would only be the case if two conditions were met: (a) evolutionary theory logically excludes the truth of any religion and (b) scientific realism is true. Since both (a) and (b) are false, and since evolutionary theory is very useful in explaining the origins and development of life, the Christian not only can but ought to accept evolutionary theory.
Sunday, October 07, 2007
What Shall We Pray For This Evening?
My title is a quotation from the priest who presided at my Nuptial Mass--it was his usual formula for introducing the Prayers of the People at the evening Newman Center Masses I attended when I was in graduate school. Various people in the congregation would then voice their petitions, and their petitions were very often in the form of rather explicit requests for God to intervene in their lives in a very noticeable and, indeed, extraordinary way. Some wanted healings for specific maladies, others wanted the U.S. government to do something about this or that social problem, yet others asked God to take over the minds of certain people and cause them to think differently than they do (though they didn't always put that last petition in exactly those words).
As long as I've been a believing Christian, I've been troubled by a certain attitude towards prayer in general and towards the miraculous/mysterious in particular that is illustrated in these petitions. Before I converted, I knew folks who would drive around a parking lot praying to find a good parking space, folks who would pray for "miraculous" cures for some specific case of "incurable" cancer, folks who would pray for their favorite team to win a sporting event, folks who would pray for world peace. Some of these petitions seem to be rather evidently better than others as petitions go, at least if we are to judge such things on the basis of their more universal appeal and benefit to the common good, but in a certain sense they are all the same: they all ask God to do something for us that we would like to have done right away and that we cannot accomplish on our own. To the extent that some of them seem beyond the reach of natural processes, such as the healing of what looks to be an incurable cancer, to have such prayers "answered" in a certain way would seem "miraculous", and given that God's omnipotence is beyond our understanding, such "answers" to prayer would also seem "mysterious".
This attitude towards prayer, that is, prayer as a means to obtaining something tangible in this way, is obviously a very naive notion, but it is fairly widespread. I don't think there's anything that can be done about this attitude, but I think it is mistaken. It seems fairly clear to me that God does not, as they say, "work that way". Folks who adopt this attitude towards prayer, however, get a little riled up if you suggest such a thing. If you point to all the very deeply faithful people who pray fervently for things such as these, only to have their prayer requests "denied" by an allegedly omnibenevolent God, you often hear "explanations" running from "those people aren't as faithful as you thought they were" to "God always answers every prayer, but sometimes the answer is 'no', and we mere mortals are in no position to second-guess the almighty: there may be a very good reason for letting a little infant die horribly of cancer in spite of his parents' fervent prayers for a cure, sometimes God brings great good out of the worst evil." I think that all such answers are desperate attempts to grasp at very thin straws, and that all such answers could be avoided if a different attitude towards prayer were taken in the first place.
Today's Gospel reading illustrates what I have in mind. Our Lord says that, if you have sufficient faith, you will be able to say to this tree, be uprooted and planted in the sea, and it will happen. Now, it seems to me that the very first thing to strike one's attention about this is not how powerful faith can be if you have it but, Who in the world would pray for something like that? It's not the sort of thing that would ordinarily count as the object of one's deepest desire, so surely it is a metaphor for something else, but what? In other versions of the story it is a mountain that gets thrown into the sea, so it is tempting to interpret the story as what you can achieve if you have great enough faith, but that seems to me to be just a version of magical thinking: all I have to do is believe in the right way, and God will do whatever I ask him to do. This turns prayer into something rather utilitarian, in my view: trust me enough, and I'll do what you ask, I'll satisfy your desires, whatever they may be.
That this is not the proper way to read the story seems clear enough, I think, because of what follows, the story of the unprofitable servant. Now, if ever there were any textual evidence that Luke is relying on an independent source consisting of a random assemblage of logoi of Our Lord, this is it, and yet it fits right in with the story of the uprooted tree. The point of faith and prayer is not to provide evidence to God that we have accomplished something highly praiseworthy (great faith in him) that warrants some sort of prize (an answer to our prayer in the form of satisfaction of desire). You do not reward somebody for doing their duty. (My children often make this mistake. My son will ask for some sort of treat because he was nice to his sister all day. He is mystified when I tell him that one does not get treats for doing what one is required to do.) So it seems to me that the point of the uprooted tree story cannot be that, if your faith is great enough, God will answer your prayers in the way that people often want him to answer their prayers, that is, by curing some disease, or bringing about world peace, or in general causing things to be other than they are by a miraculous intervention in human history. Although God may, in fact, do such things, I myself don't believe that there is a sufficient reason to believe, in any particular case, that that is what has happened, apart from the Scriptural accounts in which it is made explicit that that is what has happened.
My own view is that the purpose of prayer is not to bring about a satisfaction of material desire in the first place. Its purpose is to satisfy a different sort of desire, namely, the desire for closeness to God. It seems to me that the happiness one experiences, when one obtains satisfaction of material desire, is in itself merely an image of the much greater happiness that we experience when we have friendship with God, just as the pain that we experience in this life is an image of the pain that is sin, i.e., separation from God. All sickness, disease, and death have fully naturalistic explanations, of course, but that does not mean that in the greater ontology that goes beyond mere materialism they are not also signs of something else. The Christian must always be on the lookout for the deeper meaning that is shot through all of material reality, because the Christian is not a materialist: he does not believe that material reality is all that there is, even though it is all that we have access to via the senses. This is why the Christian can be neither a materialist nor an empiricist (at least not globally; he may be locally either one, and indeed he must be if he is also a scientist, but local materialism and local empiricism will not satisfy the likes of a Dawkins or a Dennett, and that is why the Christian must also be an anti-realist about science). So the Christian cannot view prayer as a mere means of rearranging the material furniture of his earthly existence, since that furniture is nothing but a sign of something else and is, in itself, utterly meaningless. If I pray for anything at all, whether it is a parking place or a cure for cancer, what I ought really to be praying for is friendship with God. If I have cancer, I may well be dying. Both the cancer and the process of dying are fully materialistic processes, when viewed from one perspective; but viewed from the Christian perspective they are also signs of sinfulness. Not of some specific, unconfessed sin that I bear on my conscience, mind you, but of the general separation that exists between man and God as a consequence of the Fall. Thanks to Christ, that separation has been healed, but strictly by the grace of God, not in virtue of anything that we have done that deserves a treat or a reward from God in the form of a material answer to a prayer for material comfort.
Instead, God answers prayer by drawing us closer to him. In this sense, I would say, not that God answers every prayer but the answer is sometimes 'no', but I would say rather that God answers every prayer and the answer is always 'yes', even though we may sometimes fail to see the answer, because, like the woman at the well, we don't always know what we're asking for. If I continue to die of cancer, in spite of prayers that I be saved, it is not because God "has other plans" for me. He is, in fact, answering my prayer by loving me and the faith that I display in him by uttering the prayer in the first place. If I expect him to heal my cancer, it may be that I will be disappointed if there is no cure. I may be tempted to say, "My faith was not great enough"; or "God will bring some greater good out of this evil". But responses like these fail to see what prayer fundamentally is, because they assess the "success" of a prayer in terms of whether the human desire for material comfort was met. The best prayer, the prayer that ought to be in every Christian heart at all times, is always "thy will be done". It should be an obvious corollary of that prayer that we do not wish for God's will to conform to ours when it gets done, but that ours be conformed to his, whatever it may be. In this sense, the Christian calling can be a very difficult one, because we are animals that have desires, and we tend to judge our fortunes, our human flourishing, in terms of how well our desires have been met. We often fail to understand that there is one desire that is not a material one that matters more than any other, and that meeting that desire often involves sacrificing all of the other desires. That is what martyrdom amounts to: bearing witness to the truth of the Gospel, that there is a way of life that is not always materially comfortable but that is always preferable to any other way of life because it is spiritually comfortable.
As long as I've been a believing Christian, I've been troubled by a certain attitude towards prayer in general and towards the miraculous/mysterious in particular that is illustrated in these petitions. Before I converted, I knew folks who would drive around a parking lot praying to find a good parking space, folks who would pray for "miraculous" cures for some specific case of "incurable" cancer, folks who would pray for their favorite team to win a sporting event, folks who would pray for world peace. Some of these petitions seem to be rather evidently better than others as petitions go, at least if we are to judge such things on the basis of their more universal appeal and benefit to the common good, but in a certain sense they are all the same: they all ask God to do something for us that we would like to have done right away and that we cannot accomplish on our own. To the extent that some of them seem beyond the reach of natural processes, such as the healing of what looks to be an incurable cancer, to have such prayers "answered" in a certain way would seem "miraculous", and given that God's omnipotence is beyond our understanding, such "answers" to prayer would also seem "mysterious".
This attitude towards prayer, that is, prayer as a means to obtaining something tangible in this way, is obviously a very naive notion, but it is fairly widespread. I don't think there's anything that can be done about this attitude, but I think it is mistaken. It seems fairly clear to me that God does not, as they say, "work that way". Folks who adopt this attitude towards prayer, however, get a little riled up if you suggest such a thing. If you point to all the very deeply faithful people who pray fervently for things such as these, only to have their prayer requests "denied" by an allegedly omnibenevolent God, you often hear "explanations" running from "those people aren't as faithful as you thought they were" to "God always answers every prayer, but sometimes the answer is 'no', and we mere mortals are in no position to second-guess the almighty: there may be a very good reason for letting a little infant die horribly of cancer in spite of his parents' fervent prayers for a cure, sometimes God brings great good out of the worst evil." I think that all such answers are desperate attempts to grasp at very thin straws, and that all such answers could be avoided if a different attitude towards prayer were taken in the first place.
Today's Gospel reading illustrates what I have in mind. Our Lord says that, if you have sufficient faith, you will be able to say to this tree, be uprooted and planted in the sea, and it will happen. Now, it seems to me that the very first thing to strike one's attention about this is not how powerful faith can be if you have it but, Who in the world would pray for something like that? It's not the sort of thing that would ordinarily count as the object of one's deepest desire, so surely it is a metaphor for something else, but what? In other versions of the story it is a mountain that gets thrown into the sea, so it is tempting to interpret the story as what you can achieve if you have great enough faith, but that seems to me to be just a version of magical thinking: all I have to do is believe in the right way, and God will do whatever I ask him to do. This turns prayer into something rather utilitarian, in my view: trust me enough, and I'll do what you ask, I'll satisfy your desires, whatever they may be.
That this is not the proper way to read the story seems clear enough, I think, because of what follows, the story of the unprofitable servant. Now, if ever there were any textual evidence that Luke is relying on an independent source consisting of a random assemblage of logoi of Our Lord, this is it, and yet it fits right in with the story of the uprooted tree. The point of faith and prayer is not to provide evidence to God that we have accomplished something highly praiseworthy (great faith in him) that warrants some sort of prize (an answer to our prayer in the form of satisfaction of desire). You do not reward somebody for doing their duty. (My children often make this mistake. My son will ask for some sort of treat because he was nice to his sister all day. He is mystified when I tell him that one does not get treats for doing what one is required to do.) So it seems to me that the point of the uprooted tree story cannot be that, if your faith is great enough, God will answer your prayers in the way that people often want him to answer their prayers, that is, by curing some disease, or bringing about world peace, or in general causing things to be other than they are by a miraculous intervention in human history. Although God may, in fact, do such things, I myself don't believe that there is a sufficient reason to believe, in any particular case, that that is what has happened, apart from the Scriptural accounts in which it is made explicit that that is what has happened.
My own view is that the purpose of prayer is not to bring about a satisfaction of material desire in the first place. Its purpose is to satisfy a different sort of desire, namely, the desire for closeness to God. It seems to me that the happiness one experiences, when one obtains satisfaction of material desire, is in itself merely an image of the much greater happiness that we experience when we have friendship with God, just as the pain that we experience in this life is an image of the pain that is sin, i.e., separation from God. All sickness, disease, and death have fully naturalistic explanations, of course, but that does not mean that in the greater ontology that goes beyond mere materialism they are not also signs of something else. The Christian must always be on the lookout for the deeper meaning that is shot through all of material reality, because the Christian is not a materialist: he does not believe that material reality is all that there is, even though it is all that we have access to via the senses. This is why the Christian can be neither a materialist nor an empiricist (at least not globally; he may be locally either one, and indeed he must be if he is also a scientist, but local materialism and local empiricism will not satisfy the likes of a Dawkins or a Dennett, and that is why the Christian must also be an anti-realist about science). So the Christian cannot view prayer as a mere means of rearranging the material furniture of his earthly existence, since that furniture is nothing but a sign of something else and is, in itself, utterly meaningless. If I pray for anything at all, whether it is a parking place or a cure for cancer, what I ought really to be praying for is friendship with God. If I have cancer, I may well be dying. Both the cancer and the process of dying are fully materialistic processes, when viewed from one perspective; but viewed from the Christian perspective they are also signs of sinfulness. Not of some specific, unconfessed sin that I bear on my conscience, mind you, but of the general separation that exists between man and God as a consequence of the Fall. Thanks to Christ, that separation has been healed, but strictly by the grace of God, not in virtue of anything that we have done that deserves a treat or a reward from God in the form of a material answer to a prayer for material comfort.
Instead, God answers prayer by drawing us closer to him. In this sense, I would say, not that God answers every prayer but the answer is sometimes 'no', but I would say rather that God answers every prayer and the answer is always 'yes', even though we may sometimes fail to see the answer, because, like the woman at the well, we don't always know what we're asking for. If I continue to die of cancer, in spite of prayers that I be saved, it is not because God "has other plans" for me. He is, in fact, answering my prayer by loving me and the faith that I display in him by uttering the prayer in the first place. If I expect him to heal my cancer, it may be that I will be disappointed if there is no cure. I may be tempted to say, "My faith was not great enough"; or "God will bring some greater good out of this evil". But responses like these fail to see what prayer fundamentally is, because they assess the "success" of a prayer in terms of whether the human desire for material comfort was met. The best prayer, the prayer that ought to be in every Christian heart at all times, is always "thy will be done". It should be an obvious corollary of that prayer that we do not wish for God's will to conform to ours when it gets done, but that ours be conformed to his, whatever it may be. In this sense, the Christian calling can be a very difficult one, because we are animals that have desires, and we tend to judge our fortunes, our human flourishing, in terms of how well our desires have been met. We often fail to understand that there is one desire that is not a material one that matters more than any other, and that meeting that desire often involves sacrificing all of the other desires. That is what martyrdom amounts to: bearing witness to the truth of the Gospel, that there is a way of life that is not always materially comfortable but that is always preferable to any other way of life because it is spiritually comfortable.
Saturday, October 06, 2007
Meet the new Boss...Same as the Old Boss
Theo Hobson, writing for the Guardian, has some interesting thoughts about Richard Dawkins:
The truth is that Dawkins does not want equal rights; he wants what he says that the Jewish lobby has: disproportionate influence. If atheists had more political power, "the world would be a better place". He wants the gospel of atheism to spread; he wants it to change the culture.The dreams of folks like Dawkins have inspired many over the centuries, inlcuding the likes of Lenin, Stalin, and others who would have the state mandate what you can, and what you cannot, offer up in the interest of the common good. The results of following up on such dreams have inevitably been far worse for the common good than following up on the theistic dream.
I have been chided in the past for referring to the "militant" atheism of Dawkins and his like. But the desire for one's creed to spread, in order to make the world a better place, surely merits the label. Atheists reply that there is nothing dangerous or sinister in the desire to see more rationality, less superstition. Really? Dawkins was asked what he hoped an atheist bloc in the US might achieve, and this is the first part of the answer he gave: "I would free children of being indoctrinated with the religion of their parents or their community." Is this not amazing? I have seldom read a sentence that has induced such a sharp shiver of revulsion. This man evidently dreams of a state in which it is illegal to take one's children to a place of worship, or to say prayers with them as one puts them to bed.
Friday, October 05, 2007
Infallibility
In the recent discussions about the "authoritativeness" of the Ordinary Magisterium in general, and of Papal teachings in particular, there has been a danger of equivocation upon the word "authoritative" that must be avoided. The danger lies in the temptation to conflate "authoritative" with "infallible".
Strictly speaking, only persons may be infallible, as only persons may be fallible. The term "infallible" simply means immunity from error, and it would be a strange sort of category mistake to describe an assertion that is true as "infallible". Assertions as such are neither "fallible" nor "infallible", they are either true or false. If an assertion is true, we may call it "authoritative" in the sense that the truth demands assent, but we do not say that it is "infallible" because it is either pointless or trivial to say that truth is "immune" to falsity. Hence, very strictly speaking, we do not say that the teachings of the Ordinary Magisterium are "infallible", we say that they are "authoritative". In a looser way, of course, we do speak of the "indefectibility" of the Church, and by this we usually tend to mean that we believe the Church to be immune to error, but this is a sort of analogous statement by which we reify an institution that would not ordinarily be capable, qua institution, of infallibility tout court.
The Pope, by contrast, is infallible, because he is a person. His teachings are authoritative because of the authority of the office he holds, as I maintained in my earlier posts in this thread, by virtue of a very positive influx of divine grace. As the First Vatican Council formulated it:
Another point that bears emphasizing is that infallibility differs from revelation in the following sense: revelation is always of new truth, while infallibility refers to the charism of preserving what has already been revealed. That is, when the Pope enjoys the charism of infallibility it is not the case that he is thereby enjoying a charism for the teaching of new, revealed truths coming down from heaven straight into his mouth. He is merely directing the Church's interpretation of what is already known via revelation. In this sense, the Pope's charism of infallibility is an instrument of the development of doctrine as Newman understood it. (It is interesting to note that Newman was not, at first, particularly comfortable with the Council's definition, because he believed that the consequence of defining the charism would, in fact, be to provide fodder for calling into question what ought to have been obvious about the Pope's teaching office.)
Another way to put this point would be to note that infallibility is not inspiration, that is, it is not, in fact, the voice of God speaking in the Pope's heart. It is, rather, a providential aid that the Pope enjoys by divine grace. Hence it is the Pope himself, and not God, who is the author of the teachings that are made by virtue of the charism of infallibility. Again, the charism of infallibility is only enjoyed by the Pope under certain very restrictive conditions, and one must keep those conditions in mind, along with the fact that infallibility is not at all the same thing as impeccability, that is, immunity from sin. No Pope enjoys impeccability as a charism of his office. According to the Ordinary Magisterium, Our Lord and Our Lady are the only human beings to enjoy impeccability (though it has sometimes been maintained that the Apostles, after Pentecost, were aided by divine grace in avoiding sin).
The standard schema, then, is often put this way: by revelation, God speaks his divine word; by inspiration he projects it into the human community; by infallibility he protects it from corruption within that community. Standard schemata, however, are made to be challenged, so it comes as no surprise to find that this one is challenged, too. The first element is challenged by the atheist or other non-Christian who simply does not accept the fact that knowledge of God is possible, or that it is possible in the way that Christians maintain that it is. The second is challenged by theists outside of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, who do not accept the word as preached by the prophets and teachers within the Tradition. The third element is challenged by a rather motley crew that includes probably a little bit of everyone who is not Catholic. For the Catholic, however, there is no way around this one, given the ecclesiology behind the teaching: if the Church herself, through the Ordinary Magisterium, teaches that the Pope is infallible under the circumstances described above, there is no logically consistent way to deny the teaching without simultaneously denying the authority of the Church to teach what is to be believed de fide.
This raises the very important issue of the consensus fidelium, that is, the nature of infallibility as predicated, not of any one particular individual, but of the body of Christian faithful, that is, the Church qua collective body of individual believers, to whom God has entrusted the fullness of his revelation. The Second Vatican Council identified this form of infallibility as the precursor to that enjoyed by the Pope and the College of Bishops (see, for example, Lumen Gentium, 2.12). An interesting facet of this form of infallibility is rather easier to see if one imagines the situation of the neophyte in the second and third quarters of the first century, before any of the New Testament texts had been committed to writing. During the period immediately following the death of Our Lord there was a variety of groups claiming to be followers of the Christ, but they certainly did not all agree on the nature of what it meant to be such a follower. Some versions of the story were decidedly heretical. These versions came later to be committed to writing as well as the more familiar (to us) orthodox texts, but for the neophyte of the years A.D. 33-80 there were no Gospel accounts other than those that were preached orally in the local house-churches in which the Christians met. The neophyte had to trust that the word he was hearing was authentic and authoritative. The only way to have such trust was to accept, by virtue of divine grace, the truth of what was preached. Certainly the Holy Spirit would not provide divine grace to believe a false account: it is an article of our faith that orthodoxy became what it is by virtue of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit himself. Of course, from a secular point of view, orthodoxy triumphed over heresy simply by strength of numbers, and then the victorious party suppressed the vanquished, as victorious parties usually do. There is no reason for the believer to accept the secular version of the story, however, since it is underdetermined by the data, but that fact is actually beside the point here, since I am addressing not the atheist or the non-Christian, but the person who challenges the third element of the schema, infallibility.
So it is the teaching authority of the Christian community itself that demands the assent of the neophyte on the grounds that said community is under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. It is not strength of numbers, obviously, that makes the community infallible, as though the truth could be determined by majority vote, but rather this inner spiritual unity emanating from the Holy Spirit and directing them in the truth. It is particularly important to note that it was under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit that the Christian community produced the texts that now form the New Testament: the authority of these texts derives strictly from the authority of the Church to promulgate them as authoritative. In this context it is worth pointing out that the expression consensus fidelium, along with the others that are often used in the same way (universitas fidelium, universalem consensum), does not imply that there is now, or that there ever was, a time in which all Christians believed precisely the same thing in the sense that they all assent to precisely the same set of assertions. The consensus refers to that which unites Christians, namely, their belief in what is true and that they are inspired to believe by the Holy Spirit. Anyone who denies that the Church has this inspiration has no reason to believe in orthodoxy rather than heresy. That is, if you deny that the Church enjoys this charism, then there is no reason for you to be a Christian rather than a Gnostic, or an Arian, or indeed a Jew or a Muslim or even an atheist, because there is no reason for you to accept anything that the Church has ever taught, including such things as the divinity or resurrection of Our Lord or any of the other familiar elements of the Gospel. The charism to teach authoritatively, in other words, is centrally essential to all Christian belief. Indeed, without it there is no Christian belief.
Most non-Catholics, of course, do not deny this, just so long as the word "Church" is taken to mean "body of believers". There seems to be some hesitation about associating the term with any particular institutional body of believers. It is here, however, that the office of the Successor of Peter becomes essential to the Catholic position. As early as the Council of Ephesus and the dispute with Nestorius there is evidence that it is the unity of the College of Bishops with the Successor to Peter that gives an Ecumenical Council its magisterial authority. It was this aspect of the Petrine office that was the guarantor of the Council's authenticity. In the person of the Pope we find a sacramental image of the infallibility of the entire Christian community--a manifestation of that unity in the Spirit that is the special charism of the Church, but that unity is made explicit by residing in a special way in a single individual, the Pope. His infallibility belongs to him not as a private theologian or Christian person, but as a public person, the single head of the universal Church. Accordingly, the individual man who happens to fill the office of Pope enjoys infallibility only when he acts qua Pope, and as I have pointed out in earlier posts, he does not act qua Pope when he teaches error, he can only act qua Pope when he teaches what is true. But when he does, in fact, teach what is true, it is the belief of the Church that he teaches the truth by virtue of a special charism of the Spirit that protects him from error.
Although the Pope enjoys a special charism in this respect, he does not enjoy it in isolation from the rest of the Church. It is qua head of the Church that he enjoys the charism, after all. Hence the Pope is expected to take the universal Church into consideration when asked to settle a matter affecting the whole Church: regional and ecumenical councils, episcopal synods, the views of the College of Cardinals, the views of philosophers and theologians, all must be taken into account in the process of settling an issue. It is simply not the case that the Pope, qua Pope, thinks through an issue on his own and dictates by fiat what is to be believed de fide.
The two most famous instances of a Pope explicitly exercising his charism of infallibility are the definitions of the dogmata of the Assumption of Our Lady and of the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady. While these are the most famous instances, however, it is by no means clear that they are the only instances, in spite of what is often taught in RCIA classes. It has sometimes been assumed that, in order for a Papal decree to count as taught in accordance with the charism of infallibility, the Pope must explicitly claim, in the text of his decree, that he intends to exercise his charism, by using words along the lines of "in communion with the whole Church and in my capacity as the Successor of Peter, I solemnly declare and define etc.", but the Counciliar definition sets no necessary and sufficient conditions of this kind for infallible pronouncements. All that is required is that the Pope intend to exercise the charism; whether he makes explicit that he is doing so is up to him. Granted, from an epistemological point of view, such formulas as the one above are useful, because they help to avoid ambiguity on the point. However, I think that it is fair to say that, for example, John Paul's Ordinatio sacerdotalis is an instance of the charism of infallibility in spite of the fact that it does not contain the same sort of declarative wording that the dogmata of the Assumption and Immacualte Conception contain. But Ordinatio sacerdotalis has become a rather controversial document, and perhaps a clearer declarative statement would have been in order. Be that as it may, suffice it to repeat that the Council did not require any specific verbal formula.
Strictly speaking, only persons may be infallible, as only persons may be fallible. The term "infallible" simply means immunity from error, and it would be a strange sort of category mistake to describe an assertion that is true as "infallible". Assertions as such are neither "fallible" nor "infallible", they are either true or false. If an assertion is true, we may call it "authoritative" in the sense that the truth demands assent, but we do not say that it is "infallible" because it is either pointless or trivial to say that truth is "immune" to falsity. Hence, very strictly speaking, we do not say that the teachings of the Ordinary Magisterium are "infallible", we say that they are "authoritative". In a looser way, of course, we do speak of the "indefectibility" of the Church, and by this we usually tend to mean that we believe the Church to be immune to error, but this is a sort of analogous statement by which we reify an institution that would not ordinarily be capable, qua institution, of infallibility tout court.
The Pope, by contrast, is infallible, because he is a person. His teachings are authoritative because of the authority of the office he holds, as I maintained in my earlier posts in this thread, by virtue of a very positive influx of divine grace. As the First Vatican Council formulated it:
The Roman Pontiff when he speaks ex cathedra,that is, when acting in the office of shepherd and teacher of all Christians, he defines, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, doctrine concerning faith and morals to be held by the universal Church, possesses through the divine assistance promised to him in the person of St. Peter, the infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed in defining doctrine concering faith or morals; and that such definitions are therefore irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the ChurchThat last bit needs a little explication. It is important to note that the Church's belief in the infallibility of the Pope is not itself a Papal teaching, that is, there is no circularity involved in claiming this charism for the Pope: in addition to having been an element of the consensus fidelium in one form or another for quite some time, it is here defined by an Ecumenical Council, and the authoritativeness of Ecumenical Councils is not questioned by orthodox Christians (though, obviously, certain minority communities within the Christian community do question whether certain particular councils were genuinely "ecumenical" in the authoritative sense). There are, I believe, some folks who call themselves "Christians" but who reject the authority of Ecumenical Councils to define the Christian faith, but as I regard that point of view as utterly incoherent I will leave to others the task of trying to enter into dialog with such persons.
Another point that bears emphasizing is that infallibility differs from revelation in the following sense: revelation is always of new truth, while infallibility refers to the charism of preserving what has already been revealed. That is, when the Pope enjoys the charism of infallibility it is not the case that he is thereby enjoying a charism for the teaching of new, revealed truths coming down from heaven straight into his mouth. He is merely directing the Church's interpretation of what is already known via revelation. In this sense, the Pope's charism of infallibility is an instrument of the development of doctrine as Newman understood it. (It is interesting to note that Newman was not, at first, particularly comfortable with the Council's definition, because he believed that the consequence of defining the charism would, in fact, be to provide fodder for calling into question what ought to have been obvious about the Pope's teaching office.)
Another way to put this point would be to note that infallibility is not inspiration, that is, it is not, in fact, the voice of God speaking in the Pope's heart. It is, rather, a providential aid that the Pope enjoys by divine grace. Hence it is the Pope himself, and not God, who is the author of the teachings that are made by virtue of the charism of infallibility. Again, the charism of infallibility is only enjoyed by the Pope under certain very restrictive conditions, and one must keep those conditions in mind, along with the fact that infallibility is not at all the same thing as impeccability, that is, immunity from sin. No Pope enjoys impeccability as a charism of his office. According to the Ordinary Magisterium, Our Lord and Our Lady are the only human beings to enjoy impeccability (though it has sometimes been maintained that the Apostles, after Pentecost, were aided by divine grace in avoiding sin).
The standard schema, then, is often put this way: by revelation, God speaks his divine word; by inspiration he projects it into the human community; by infallibility he protects it from corruption within that community. Standard schemata, however, are made to be challenged, so it comes as no surprise to find that this one is challenged, too. The first element is challenged by the atheist or other non-Christian who simply does not accept the fact that knowledge of God is possible, or that it is possible in the way that Christians maintain that it is. The second is challenged by theists outside of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, who do not accept the word as preached by the prophets and teachers within the Tradition. The third element is challenged by a rather motley crew that includes probably a little bit of everyone who is not Catholic. For the Catholic, however, there is no way around this one, given the ecclesiology behind the teaching: if the Church herself, through the Ordinary Magisterium, teaches that the Pope is infallible under the circumstances described above, there is no logically consistent way to deny the teaching without simultaneously denying the authority of the Church to teach what is to be believed de fide.
This raises the very important issue of the consensus fidelium, that is, the nature of infallibility as predicated, not of any one particular individual, but of the body of Christian faithful, that is, the Church qua collective body of individual believers, to whom God has entrusted the fullness of his revelation. The Second Vatican Council identified this form of infallibility as the precursor to that enjoyed by the Pope and the College of Bishops (see, for example, Lumen Gentium, 2.12). An interesting facet of this form of infallibility is rather easier to see if one imagines the situation of the neophyte in the second and third quarters of the first century, before any of the New Testament texts had been committed to writing. During the period immediately following the death of Our Lord there was a variety of groups claiming to be followers of the Christ, but they certainly did not all agree on the nature of what it meant to be such a follower. Some versions of the story were decidedly heretical. These versions came later to be committed to writing as well as the more familiar (to us) orthodox texts, but for the neophyte of the years A.D. 33-80 there were no Gospel accounts other than those that were preached orally in the local house-churches in which the Christians met. The neophyte had to trust that the word he was hearing was authentic and authoritative. The only way to have such trust was to accept, by virtue of divine grace, the truth of what was preached. Certainly the Holy Spirit would not provide divine grace to believe a false account: it is an article of our faith that orthodoxy became what it is by virtue of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit himself. Of course, from a secular point of view, orthodoxy triumphed over heresy simply by strength of numbers, and then the victorious party suppressed the vanquished, as victorious parties usually do. There is no reason for the believer to accept the secular version of the story, however, since it is underdetermined by the data, but that fact is actually beside the point here, since I am addressing not the atheist or the non-Christian, but the person who challenges the third element of the schema, infallibility.
So it is the teaching authority of the Christian community itself that demands the assent of the neophyte on the grounds that said community is under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. It is not strength of numbers, obviously, that makes the community infallible, as though the truth could be determined by majority vote, but rather this inner spiritual unity emanating from the Holy Spirit and directing them in the truth. It is particularly important to note that it was under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit that the Christian community produced the texts that now form the New Testament: the authority of these texts derives strictly from the authority of the Church to promulgate them as authoritative. In this context it is worth pointing out that the expression consensus fidelium, along with the others that are often used in the same way (universitas fidelium, universalem consensum), does not imply that there is now, or that there ever was, a time in which all Christians believed precisely the same thing in the sense that they all assent to precisely the same set of assertions. The consensus refers to that which unites Christians, namely, their belief in what is true and that they are inspired to believe by the Holy Spirit. Anyone who denies that the Church has this inspiration has no reason to believe in orthodoxy rather than heresy. That is, if you deny that the Church enjoys this charism, then there is no reason for you to be a Christian rather than a Gnostic, or an Arian, or indeed a Jew or a Muslim or even an atheist, because there is no reason for you to accept anything that the Church has ever taught, including such things as the divinity or resurrection of Our Lord or any of the other familiar elements of the Gospel. The charism to teach authoritatively, in other words, is centrally essential to all Christian belief. Indeed, without it there is no Christian belief.
Most non-Catholics, of course, do not deny this, just so long as the word "Church" is taken to mean "body of believers". There seems to be some hesitation about associating the term with any particular institutional body of believers. It is here, however, that the office of the Successor of Peter becomes essential to the Catholic position. As early as the Council of Ephesus and the dispute with Nestorius there is evidence that it is the unity of the College of Bishops with the Successor to Peter that gives an Ecumenical Council its magisterial authority. It was this aspect of the Petrine office that was the guarantor of the Council's authenticity. In the person of the Pope we find a sacramental image of the infallibility of the entire Christian community--a manifestation of that unity in the Spirit that is the special charism of the Church, but that unity is made explicit by residing in a special way in a single individual, the Pope. His infallibility belongs to him not as a private theologian or Christian person, but as a public person, the single head of the universal Church. Accordingly, the individual man who happens to fill the office of Pope enjoys infallibility only when he acts qua Pope, and as I have pointed out in earlier posts, he does not act qua Pope when he teaches error, he can only act qua Pope when he teaches what is true. But when he does, in fact, teach what is true, it is the belief of the Church that he teaches the truth by virtue of a special charism of the Spirit that protects him from error.
Although the Pope enjoys a special charism in this respect, he does not enjoy it in isolation from the rest of the Church. It is qua head of the Church that he enjoys the charism, after all. Hence the Pope is expected to take the universal Church into consideration when asked to settle a matter affecting the whole Church: regional and ecumenical councils, episcopal synods, the views of the College of Cardinals, the views of philosophers and theologians, all must be taken into account in the process of settling an issue. It is simply not the case that the Pope, qua Pope, thinks through an issue on his own and dictates by fiat what is to be believed de fide.
The two most famous instances of a Pope explicitly exercising his charism of infallibility are the definitions of the dogmata of the Assumption of Our Lady and of the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady. While these are the most famous instances, however, it is by no means clear that they are the only instances, in spite of what is often taught in RCIA classes. It has sometimes been assumed that, in order for a Papal decree to count as taught in accordance with the charism of infallibility, the Pope must explicitly claim, in the text of his decree, that he intends to exercise his charism, by using words along the lines of "in communion with the whole Church and in my capacity as the Successor of Peter, I solemnly declare and define etc.", but the Counciliar definition sets no necessary and sufficient conditions of this kind for infallible pronouncements. All that is required is that the Pope intend to exercise the charism; whether he makes explicit that he is doing so is up to him. Granted, from an epistemological point of view, such formulas as the one above are useful, because they help to avoid ambiguity on the point. However, I think that it is fair to say that, for example, John Paul's Ordinatio sacerdotalis is an instance of the charism of infallibility in spite of the fact that it does not contain the same sort of declarative wording that the dogmata of the Assumption and Immacualte Conception contain. But Ordinatio sacerdotalis has become a rather controversial document, and perhaps a clearer declarative statement would have been in order. Be that as it may, suffice it to repeat that the Council did not require any specific verbal formula.
Thursday, October 04, 2007
Consensus Fidelium
Dr. Michael Liccione has posted a follow-up to some of the things that I wrote in my posts of last week on the Principle of Adolescent Posturing (here and here). Mike thinks that we disagree about a certain entailment relation that exists between the Church's teaching charism and the authoritativness of her teachings, but in fact we do not have any genuine disagreement regarding the substance of the matter, as far as I can see. Whether that is good news to him or not is probably not my place to say. However, there is one point he makes that suggests where, perhaps, he thinks our difference may lie:
So our difference, if it is one, is only this: I draw a distinction between the metaphysical question and the epistemological question regarding authoritativeness. One question, the metaphysical one, has to do with what it is that is constitutive of authoritativeness in the Church, that is, what is the ontological correlate that gives meaning to the term "authoritativenes". The other question, the epistemological one, has to do with how we can come to know that a teaching is authoritative, given that we are mere men and the people who fill the teaching offices of the Church are also mere men. On this latter question I believe Mike and I are, together, in full agreement with Cardinal Newman.
Although I don't think that we actually have any real disagreement in this matter, I am, as usual, grateful to Mike for his clarity of thought and the care with which he has stated our position.
And so I must disagree with Scott when he claims, without qualification, that our accepting certain teachings as authoritative has to do only with their truth, not with the office of the person or persons propounding them. In at least some cases, we recognize the truth of a teaching partly on account of the authority propounding it, in this the case the Magisterium. Otherwise the Magisterium would be superfluous, at least for the purpose the Church has in mind. I doubt Scott would disagree.As usual, Mike is right: I don't disagree at all. In fact, I'm quite certain that if one were to work through all of the posts I have put up on this rather complex topic (going back to last November and December, when Mike and I were discussing the development of doctrine), it would be rather simple to confirm that I see the consensus fidelium, here understood as a manifestation of the authentic Ordinary Magisterium, as an essential element in the confirmation of the authoritativeness of doctrine. Indeed, this is a point that I was emphasizing in my PAP posts, that it would be impossible to distinguish between orthodoxy and heresy if one did not rely on the authoritativeness of the Church qua institution. That Mike suspected that we disagreed on this point is arguably my own fault, since I do not have the gift for exposition that he evidently has.
So our difference, if it is one, is only this: I draw a distinction between the metaphysical question and the epistemological question regarding authoritativeness. One question, the metaphysical one, has to do with what it is that is constitutive of authoritativeness in the Church, that is, what is the ontological correlate that gives meaning to the term "authoritativenes". The other question, the epistemological one, has to do with how we can come to know that a teaching is authoritative, given that we are mere men and the people who fill the teaching offices of the Church are also mere men. On this latter question I believe Mike and I are, together, in full agreement with Cardinal Newman.
Although I don't think that we actually have any real disagreement in this matter, I am, as usual, grateful to Mike for his clarity of thought and the care with which he has stated our position.
Thursday, September 27, 2007
John Bekkos
Until today I had never heard of John Bekkos, but I already like what I know about him. I learned what little I do know from Peter Gilbert, who has a blog that appears to have John Bekkos as a central point of discussion. The blog is called De unione ecclesiarum, and you may find a short summary of some of Bekkos's views here.
Bekkos was the Patriarch of Constantinople during the so-called Union of Lyons (1275-1282), and many of the opinions that Gilbert has collected strike me as quite congenial to my own views. I look forward to learning much more about him, and exploring our common heritage.
Bekkos was the Patriarch of Constantinople during the so-called Union of Lyons (1275-1282), and many of the opinions that Gilbert has collected strike me as quite congenial to my own views. I look forward to learning much more about him, and exploring our common heritage.
Budweiser is Better Beer Anyway
The Catholic League is calling for a boycott of Miller Beer, and I fully support them. I'm such a radical--I love boycotts. Off the establishment! I'm sick and tired of being hassled by the man!
In the present case, there are two very good reasons to support the boycott beyond the pure thrill of it. First, Miller Beer has historically bent over backwards to avoid offending certain groups, including Muslims, but they have no problem giving their full advertising endorsement to an event that is blatantly anti-Christian and arguably extremely offensive to most decent folks. There are some really sick dudes involved, but you gotta love that giant ice-phallus.
Second, Miller Beer sucks. Budweiser, the American knock-off of the really wonderful Czech beer Czechvar, is much better if one insists on drinking the swill that is American mass-produced light lager (though you should drink Czechvar if you can get it--it's a real beer). Even Michael Jackson called it a classic. No, not the Michael Jackson who probably wishes he could attend the Folsom Street Fair, the Michael Jackson who was, until he died recently, the eminent beer critic.
In the present case, there are two very good reasons to support the boycott beyond the pure thrill of it. First, Miller Beer has historically bent over backwards to avoid offending certain groups, including Muslims, but they have no problem giving their full advertising endorsement to an event that is blatantly anti-Christian and arguably extremely offensive to most decent folks. There are some really sick dudes involved, but you gotta love that giant ice-phallus.
Second, Miller Beer sucks. Budweiser, the American knock-off of the really wonderful Czech beer Czechvar, is much better if one insists on drinking the swill that is American mass-produced light lager (though you should drink Czechvar if you can get it--it's a real beer). Even Michael Jackson called it a classic. No, not the Michael Jackson who probably wishes he could attend the Folsom Street Fair, the Michael Jackson who was, until he died recently, the eminent beer critic.
More PAPpy Thoughts and Reflections
Both Fr. Al Kimel and Shane of Scholasticus (I'm very sorry to say that I don't know his last name, but what the heck, we're all friends here) have done me the honor of commenting on my PAP post of yesterday. I'm afraid that, at least to the best of my sorry-ass understanding of things, there is no way to link to their particular comments, so I will be referring here to their remarks simply by saying "In Fr. Al's comment" and "In Shane's comment", or else by quoting from them directly here in this post. I apologize to both of them for treating their individual comments together here, but I've been thinking of them in tandem all morning, and it seemed to me that the issues raised in each are related in a sufficiently strong sense as to be answerable under a single heading. And I apologize to my readers, if I actually have any beyond Fr. Al and Shane (if even they are reading) for a post that is really nothing more than an extended comment on the comments on an earlier post.
I will begin by treating them separately, though, starting with Fr. Al (all deference to our clergy, after all--I think I owe him some kind of brown-nosy sort of submissiveness just as a matter of brainless devotion to authority [Shane: that was a joke.]).
Fr. Al's comment really was a longish quotation, with a request for comments, from Cardinal Newman's An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, a wonderful little book from 1870 that I have blogged on before (here, here, and here) and heartily recommend to all Newman fans and, indeed, to anyone who is interested in the epistemological problems underlying Newman's conception of the development of doctrine.
I certainly agree with what Newman says in the first paragraph quoted in Fr. Al's comment--indeed, it seems to me to be a recapitulation of the point I was making in my post.
In the second paragraph, however, there is a worry. This is, of course, the old problem of the development of doctrine, and I discovered back when we were all discussing this last December and January that not all Catholics really see this precisely the same way. As some of my readers may know, I favor the idea of non-ampliative abduction as a means of developing doctrine, while Dr. Michael Liccione, with whom I discussed this issue in a series of posts here and at his blog Sacramentum Vitae, seems to me to favor ampliative abduction.
However that may be, I think one must be very careful when talking about what people ought to believe or must believe on the basis of what they claim to believe already. A rather prodigious body of scholarship has shown that many fully rational, well-educated people will reject a given assertion, q, even while asserting [(if p then q) and p]. Some of the literature interprets this as evidence that people are not, as a rule, very rational, but I take a different line. In my view, people are generally quite rational in the sense of being able to give reasons for their beliefs, but the reasons they give are not always subject to universal acceptance because they depend upon non-cognitive factors in a given individual's psychology. It is just possible, for example, that my friend the Presbyterian minister really believes that he did not commit adultery.
Granted, if I understand the meaning of the numbers from 0 to 9, the meaning of "+", and the meaning of "=", then there is a sense in which I "ought" to know every possible sum; but of course, that is an infinite number of things and there is no way that I can really actively believe all of them. So I take Newman's point to be that, as doctrine develops, there will be rational accounts of how the developed doctrine is consistent with already existing doctrine. Those accounts will take the form either of deductions or (non-)ampliative abductions. Now, deduction requires intellectual assent from everyone on pain of irrationality, but no inductive inference can make such demands; we may at best say that a strong induction demands intellectual assent from everyone on pain of seeming strange to our fellow rational agents. But some people, notoriously, do not mind being perceived as strange by their fellow rational agents, indeed, there are those who ardently seek such status.
From the point of view of the Protestant, the most problematic teachings of the Church are the abductive developments, and in all honesty I cannot say as how I blame them for being nervous about such inferential models. Surely all Protestants accept the doctrine of the Double Procession, which follows logically from the doctrine of the Trinity (I apologize here in advance to those of my Orthodox brethren who find this idea ludicrous; I will content myself with the reflection that these brethren would at least agree with me as against the Protestants on the point of the authority of the Tradition, just so long as we bracket the means by which we believe that Tradition to develop). The teaching on the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady, however, as deductively obvious as it seems to us, will appear to most of them to be an abduction, and a preternaturally weak one at that.
So the question that Shane would like for us to address is this: why should a reasonable person, who has taken it as his duty to learn about and understand as completely as possible the content of his religion, simply agree to endorse a teaching such as the Immaculate Conception if, in his heart of hearts, he believes it to be false? This is, it seems to me, a perfectly reasonable question, but it depends upon certain ambiguities, ambiguities that I attempted to highlight in my post of yesterday. The first ambiguity has to do with the nature of authority itself. There is a temptation to think that when one is told that a teaching is "authoritative" all that is meant is that we have to believe it whether we want to or not. This is not the correct understanding of the term, however. A teaching can only be authoritative if it is true, and we demand assent to authoritative teachings not because of the office of the person promulgating the teaching but because of the truth of the teaching. In the hands of arguments such as the one Shane presented at Scholasticus, this question of the truth of the doctrine gets turned into a question of trusting a particular doctrine-promulgator, which is a category mistake of the first order. Shane asks not, Why ought I to believe a true teaching--he is quick to point out that he is happy to admit that some folks may know things he doesn't know, and he will take their word in certain circumstances, and he also agrees that of course it is reasonable to accept a teaching that is true. Rather, Shane asks, Why ought I to trust the Pope to be teaching the truth when I, who am also a reasonable person, do not see that what he has to teach really follows from what we already believe?
There are a number of interesting epistemological problems presented by this sort of question. Shane is, essentially, trying to defend a principle of private judgment according to which he is within his rights to determine for himself whether the Pope, or any other instrument of the Ordinary Magisterium, really is teaching what is true rather than what is false. In other words, Shane puts his own private judgment about matters of faith and morals on a par with the collective judgment of the Church as a whole about matters of faith and morals. Possibly Shane does not see it this way; possibly he thinks, No, I'm putting my private judgment on a par with the private judgment of Joseph Ratzinger, the German theologian, or whoever it is that happens to be living in the Papal palace. But that, again, is to mistake the authority of the particular person who happens to hold the office for the authority of the office itself, understood qua instrument of the Ordinary Magisterium. The two things are not identical; indeed, they are not even analogous. So, as interesting as it might be to explore something like this, we may actually put aside for the day the question of how it would be that Shane, or any other person, could go about coming to have knowledge that he knows more about matters of faith and morals than some other person, whether the Pope or anyone else. In his comment, Shane completely ignored my point about the difference between the orthodox faith and the Gnostic heresy, but the capacity to judge the difference between them raises this very interesting epistemological puzzle: how does one know that one knows, and more specifically, how does person A know that he knows more than person B about matters of faith and morals? Shane does not offer any hypotheses about how we are to feel as secure as one would want to feel in such grave matters, but, as I remarked above, this question is irrelevant anyway, since we are not comparing person A with person B here, but person A with institution C.
It may be the case that some Protestants simply misunderstand what the teaching office of the Pope actually is. Some may think that the obligation to submit to his teaching authority is nothing more than an obligation to prefer another individual's private judgment to one's own. I will grant that, if such were really the content of the obligation, it would indeed be unreasonable. But that is not at all the content of the obligation. The passage that Fr. Al quotes from Newman goes on to elaborate what the content of the obligation is:
The beginning of the answer to this question is to remind the questioner that if the Pope really is mistaken in his understanding of what has come down to him, then he is not really teaching authoritatively. It is only the correctly understood, true teachings that we have a duty to accept. So then, given that, what do we do if we just don't trust the man? Why should we assume that he is right, when in our heart of hearts we believe differently? I suppose one could appeal to humility here, and ask how it is that one knows for sure that one is right just because one has assumed that one has thought through the problem very carefully. So has the Magisterium, after all, and the Magisterium reflects the thinking and deliberation of generation after generation of Christians of all stripes, lay, ordained, theologians, philosophers, moralists, etc.; and I know from my own sad experience that, at least in the case of my own students, whom I believe myself to have taught very well, folks often assume that they are right when they are, in fact, mistaken. Indeed, it seems to me to be a very common occurrence that the more certain one is that one is correct the greater the probability that one has missed something. But appealing to humility here may seem to the Protestant to be rather ad hoc, and surely the Catholic can come up with something more compelling than mere special pleading.
If the Protestant were to reject what Newman says, I think, he would be in a very dire position--he would really need to come up with an answer to my problem of orthodoxy vs. heresy. But I think Shane accepts what I was suggesting there: indeed, we must trust in the teaching authority of the Church, as reflected in the Apostolic doctrines, whether they be expressed in the texts of the New Testament, the decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, or the consensus fidelium. The harder question is, why should we regard the teaching authority of the Papal office to be a part and parcel of that, which is what the Catholic really demands. The Catholic will often appeal here to the fact that, it is part of the deposit of faith in the Ordinary Magisterium that the Papal office fills that role. Historically this was always widely believed, but of course history also works against the Catholic here, because American Protestants in particular are, well, Americans, and they tend to be individualists who were raised in a culture that does not look kindly on "parking one's brains at the door" and letting the Pope think for you. It is curious, of course, that the American Protestant is willing to let the Church think for him, and dictate to him that he absolutely must believe, for example, "in one holy, catholic, and apostolic church" or that "there is one Baptism for the forgiveness of sins", etc. The Church may dictate, but the Pope may not. I suspect that the reason for this apprehension about the Pope has to do with the fact that, by the very nature of the office itself, it is a single individual who is promulgating the teaching, and Americans, as a rule, think that every opinion is sacred, and who is this particular person to be dictating to me? It seems to escape their notice that the Councils of Nicea and Constantinople consisted of individual men who wrote down credal formulae that they then dictated to the rest of us. If you believe the Creed, you have to ask yourself, "on what authority do I accept the Creed as true?" Is it really because you have examined for yourself all the points contained in it and have verified, by means of your own rational faculty, the truth of all that it says? If so I can only say, I admire your balls! Surely we accept the Creed because of its antiquity and the sheer authority of the men who formulated it. They were in a position to tell us what to believe, and that position was theirs due to the teaching charism of the Church.
So the principle difference between accepting teachings from the Creed and teachings from the Papal office appears to be reducible to accepting teachings from a corporate body of men as opposed to accepting the teachings of a single man. And yet, if properly understood, the Papal office is not a single man, it is itself a corporate institution that is peopled by many men, albeit it is so populated diachronically rather than synchronically. To assert, without argument, that synchronically constituted institutions are to be preferred to diachronically constituted institutions, however, is to beg the question against the Catholic.
Now here we must address a rather peculiar problem that is specific to Shane's comment on my post of yesterday. Because it turns out that he doesn't, in fact, accept the teaching authority of the Councils uncritically:
One reason for not going all the way, of course, is obvious: someone may determine that, according to their own principled reasoning, God is not Three Persons but Two. There would be no way to "refute" such a person, since according to the private judgment argument the only criterion of correctness is consistency with one's own private judgment. Just so long as one's private judgment follows the constraints of logic, then it cannot be "refuted" in any meaningful sense, since the constraints of logic do not constrain one's starting points. In other words, we are back to the problem of orthodox vs. Gnostic heresy. According to this sort of private judgment argument, there is no such thing as heresy; or else everything that one does not think for oneself just is heresy.
This is a puzzle that Wittgenstein made much of in his Philosophical Investigations. There, he argues that there can be no such thing as a "private language", that is, a language in which the system of signs and references and predicates is entirely private. The reason is that language is essentially a public phenomenon: when someone misuses a word, he is corrected by the other members of the language using community. If I call an apple an orange, someone points out my mistake, and tries to get me to refer to apples as apples. If I persist in my error I will never be understood by my fellows. How will they know that I want to eat an apple if the only thing I ever ask for is oranges? Similar, imagine a language that is entirely internal to my own mental life. For example, my internal belief that "This headache I am having today is worse than the one I had last week." The semantic content here is expressed in English, of course, but the references are entirely private: this headache I am having today, the one I had last week. Only I know what those are like because only I experienced them. But how do even I know that the headache I am having today is worse than the one I had last week? In the case of a private language, there is no one to correct mistaken uses of the language. I rely on my memory to judge the difference between the two pains, but how do I know that my memory is serving me correctly? Who will correct me if I am mistaken? If Wittgenstein's intuition here is correct, it is not possible to have a meaningful private language of this kind.
In the case of private judgment the difficulty is very similar, though not identical. The difficulty is simply that, when the criterion of correctness is private judgment itself, there is no mechanism for correction when private judgment is mistaken. (Indeed, private judgment cannot possibly be mistaken!) This difficulty is, in my view, fatal to the whole project.
Is the alternative really nothing more than "blind faith in the Magisterium"? No, not if "Magisterium" is understood properly. When understood properly, faith in it is never blind. In particular, the Catholic assumes a large community of believers who all share a final end, and the pursuit of that end is moved forward by the commonly shared revelation and the commonly shared rational faculty that is distributed among individuals. The individual instantiation of the rational faculty is indeed under private control, but the control we apply to it is governed by the criterion of judgment that comes from the community, a standard that is outside of each one of us as individuals and yet constituted by contributions from certain individuals. The rational faculty guides us individually, but the community corrects us when we err.
I can see no reasonable way around this, or I myself would be a Protestant. I happily await an illustration of how this view fails; in particular, I would love to hear a story about how one could possibly choose between orthodoxy and the Gnostic heresy on the private judgment account. I fear that my desire for that story will be on a par with my desire to beat Tiger Woods at golf.
I will begin by treating them separately, though, starting with Fr. Al (all deference to our clergy, after all--I think I owe him some kind of brown-nosy sort of submissiveness just as a matter of brainless devotion to authority [Shane: that was a joke.]).
Fr. Al's comment really was a longish quotation, with a request for comments, from Cardinal Newman's An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, a wonderful little book from 1870 that I have blogged on before (here, here, and here) and heartily recommend to all Newman fans and, indeed, to anyone who is interested in the epistemological problems underlying Newman's conception of the development of doctrine.
I certainly agree with what Newman says in the first paragraph quoted in Fr. Al's comment--indeed, it seems to me to be a recapitulation of the point I was making in my post.
In the second paragraph, however, there is a worry. This is, of course, the old problem of the development of doctrine, and I discovered back when we were all discussing this last December and January that not all Catholics really see this precisely the same way. As some of my readers may know, I favor the idea of non-ampliative abduction as a means of developing doctrine, while Dr. Michael Liccione, with whom I discussed this issue in a series of posts here and at his blog Sacramentum Vitae, seems to me to favor ampliative abduction.
However that may be, I think one must be very careful when talking about what people ought to believe or must believe on the basis of what they claim to believe already. A rather prodigious body of scholarship has shown that many fully rational, well-educated people will reject a given assertion, q, even while asserting [(if p then q) and p]. Some of the literature interprets this as evidence that people are not, as a rule, very rational, but I take a different line. In my view, people are generally quite rational in the sense of being able to give reasons for their beliefs, but the reasons they give are not always subject to universal acceptance because they depend upon non-cognitive factors in a given individual's psychology. It is just possible, for example, that my friend the Presbyterian minister really believes that he did not commit adultery.
Granted, if I understand the meaning of the numbers from 0 to 9, the meaning of "+", and the meaning of "=", then there is a sense in which I "ought" to know every possible sum; but of course, that is an infinite number of things and there is no way that I can really actively believe all of them. So I take Newman's point to be that, as doctrine develops, there will be rational accounts of how the developed doctrine is consistent with already existing doctrine. Those accounts will take the form either of deductions or (non-)ampliative abductions. Now, deduction requires intellectual assent from everyone on pain of irrationality, but no inductive inference can make such demands; we may at best say that a strong induction demands intellectual assent from everyone on pain of seeming strange to our fellow rational agents. But some people, notoriously, do not mind being perceived as strange by their fellow rational agents, indeed, there are those who ardently seek such status.
From the point of view of the Protestant, the most problematic teachings of the Church are the abductive developments, and in all honesty I cannot say as how I blame them for being nervous about such inferential models. Surely all Protestants accept the doctrine of the Double Procession, which follows logically from the doctrine of the Trinity (I apologize here in advance to those of my Orthodox brethren who find this idea ludicrous; I will content myself with the reflection that these brethren would at least agree with me as against the Protestants on the point of the authority of the Tradition, just so long as we bracket the means by which we believe that Tradition to develop). The teaching on the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady, however, as deductively obvious as it seems to us, will appear to most of them to be an abduction, and a preternaturally weak one at that.
So the question that Shane would like for us to address is this: why should a reasonable person, who has taken it as his duty to learn about and understand as completely as possible the content of his religion, simply agree to endorse a teaching such as the Immaculate Conception if, in his heart of hearts, he believes it to be false? This is, it seems to me, a perfectly reasonable question, but it depends upon certain ambiguities, ambiguities that I attempted to highlight in my post of yesterday. The first ambiguity has to do with the nature of authority itself. There is a temptation to think that when one is told that a teaching is "authoritative" all that is meant is that we have to believe it whether we want to or not. This is not the correct understanding of the term, however. A teaching can only be authoritative if it is true, and we demand assent to authoritative teachings not because of the office of the person promulgating the teaching but because of the truth of the teaching. In the hands of arguments such as the one Shane presented at Scholasticus, this question of the truth of the doctrine gets turned into a question of trusting a particular doctrine-promulgator, which is a category mistake of the first order. Shane asks not, Why ought I to believe a true teaching--he is quick to point out that he is happy to admit that some folks may know things he doesn't know, and he will take their word in certain circumstances, and he also agrees that of course it is reasonable to accept a teaching that is true. Rather, Shane asks, Why ought I to trust the Pope to be teaching the truth when I, who am also a reasonable person, do not see that what he has to teach really follows from what we already believe?
There are a number of interesting epistemological problems presented by this sort of question. Shane is, essentially, trying to defend a principle of private judgment according to which he is within his rights to determine for himself whether the Pope, or any other instrument of the Ordinary Magisterium, really is teaching what is true rather than what is false. In other words, Shane puts his own private judgment about matters of faith and morals on a par with the collective judgment of the Church as a whole about matters of faith and morals. Possibly Shane does not see it this way; possibly he thinks, No, I'm putting my private judgment on a par with the private judgment of Joseph Ratzinger, the German theologian, or whoever it is that happens to be living in the Papal palace. But that, again, is to mistake the authority of the particular person who happens to hold the office for the authority of the office itself, understood qua instrument of the Ordinary Magisterium. The two things are not identical; indeed, they are not even analogous. So, as interesting as it might be to explore something like this, we may actually put aside for the day the question of how it would be that Shane, or any other person, could go about coming to have knowledge that he knows more about matters of faith and morals than some other person, whether the Pope or anyone else. In his comment, Shane completely ignored my point about the difference between the orthodox faith and the Gnostic heresy, but the capacity to judge the difference between them raises this very interesting epistemological puzzle: how does one know that one knows, and more specifically, how does person A know that he knows more than person B about matters of faith and morals? Shane does not offer any hypotheses about how we are to feel as secure as one would want to feel in such grave matters, but, as I remarked above, this question is irrelevant anyway, since we are not comparing person A with person B here, but person A with institution C.
It may be the case that some Protestants simply misunderstand what the teaching office of the Pope actually is. Some may think that the obligation to submit to his teaching authority is nothing more than an obligation to prefer another individual's private judgment to one's own. I will grant that, if such were really the content of the obligation, it would indeed be unreasonable. But that is not at all the content of the obligation. The passage that Fr. Al quotes from Newman goes on to elaborate what the content of the obligation is:
He who believes that Christ is the Truth, and that the Evangelists are truthful, believes all that He has said through them, though he has only read St. Matthew and has not read St. John. He who believes in the depositum of Revelation, believes in all the doctrines of the depositum; and since he cannot know them all at once, he knows some doctrines, and does not know others; he may know only the Creed, nay, perhaps only the chief portions of the Creed; but, whether he knows little or much, he has the intention of believing all that there is to believe whenever and as soon as it is brought home to him, if he believes in Revelation at all. All that he knows now as revealed, and all that he shall know, and all that there is to know, he embraces it all in his intention by one act of faith; otherwise, it is but an accident that he believes this or that, not because it is a revelation. This virtual, interpretative, or prospective belief is called a believing implicitè; and it follows from this, that, granting that the Canons of Councils and the other ecclesiastical documents and confessions, to which I have referred, are really involved in the depositum or revealed word, every Catholic, in accepting the depositum, does implicitè accept those dogmatic decisions.Perhaps plenty of Protestants will be happy to accept this much, but some will add, "But I still do not have any reason to trust the Pope, even forgetting about his personal judgments and attributing his sayings rather to the institution of his office. He is still just a man, after all, and he may perhaps misunderstand the teachings that have come down to him. Why is it a matter of virtue for me to abandon my own judgment and trust in his?"
The beginning of the answer to this question is to remind the questioner that if the Pope really is mistaken in his understanding of what has come down to him, then he is not really teaching authoritatively. It is only the correctly understood, true teachings that we have a duty to accept. So then, given that, what do we do if we just don't trust the man? Why should we assume that he is right, when in our heart of hearts we believe differently? I suppose one could appeal to humility here, and ask how it is that one knows for sure that one is right just because one has assumed that one has thought through the problem very carefully. So has the Magisterium, after all, and the Magisterium reflects the thinking and deliberation of generation after generation of Christians of all stripes, lay, ordained, theologians, philosophers, moralists, etc.; and I know from my own sad experience that, at least in the case of my own students, whom I believe myself to have taught very well, folks often assume that they are right when they are, in fact, mistaken. Indeed, it seems to me to be a very common occurrence that the more certain one is that one is correct the greater the probability that one has missed something. But appealing to humility here may seem to the Protestant to be rather ad hoc, and surely the Catholic can come up with something more compelling than mere special pleading.
If the Protestant were to reject what Newman says, I think, he would be in a very dire position--he would really need to come up with an answer to my problem of orthodoxy vs. heresy. But I think Shane accepts what I was suggesting there: indeed, we must trust in the teaching authority of the Church, as reflected in the Apostolic doctrines, whether they be expressed in the texts of the New Testament, the decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, or the consensus fidelium. The harder question is, why should we regard the teaching authority of the Papal office to be a part and parcel of that, which is what the Catholic really demands. The Catholic will often appeal here to the fact that, it is part of the deposit of faith in the Ordinary Magisterium that the Papal office fills that role. Historically this was always widely believed, but of course history also works against the Catholic here, because American Protestants in particular are, well, Americans, and they tend to be individualists who were raised in a culture that does not look kindly on "parking one's brains at the door" and letting the Pope think for you. It is curious, of course, that the American Protestant is willing to let the Church think for him, and dictate to him that he absolutely must believe, for example, "in one holy, catholic, and apostolic church" or that "there is one Baptism for the forgiveness of sins", etc. The Church may dictate, but the Pope may not. I suspect that the reason for this apprehension about the Pope has to do with the fact that, by the very nature of the office itself, it is a single individual who is promulgating the teaching, and Americans, as a rule, think that every opinion is sacred, and who is this particular person to be dictating to me? It seems to escape their notice that the Councils of Nicea and Constantinople consisted of individual men who wrote down credal formulae that they then dictated to the rest of us. If you believe the Creed, you have to ask yourself, "on what authority do I accept the Creed as true?" Is it really because you have examined for yourself all the points contained in it and have verified, by means of your own rational faculty, the truth of all that it says? If so I can only say, I admire your balls! Surely we accept the Creed because of its antiquity and the sheer authority of the men who formulated it. They were in a position to tell us what to believe, and that position was theirs due to the teaching charism of the Church.
So the principle difference between accepting teachings from the Creed and teachings from the Papal office appears to be reducible to accepting teachings from a corporate body of men as opposed to accepting the teachings of a single man. And yet, if properly understood, the Papal office is not a single man, it is itself a corporate institution that is peopled by many men, albeit it is so populated diachronically rather than synchronically. To assert, without argument, that synchronically constituted institutions are to be preferred to diachronically constituted institutions, however, is to beg the question against the Catholic.
Now here we must address a rather peculiar problem that is specific to Shane's comment on my post of yesterday. Because it turns out that he doesn't, in fact, accept the teaching authority of the Councils uncritically:
My position is that accepting X as true, just because the magisterium teaches it and claims to have an infallible teaching authority, is an act of blind faith. As such, the point of my argument is that blind faith embodies submission to authority in a vicious way. So yes, my argument does boil down to: ‘blind faith’ is bad, but with several (I thought fairly clear) distinctions drawn to avoid committing the protestant to the fallacious view you take to be my conclusion that any and all submission as such is bad.I will begin by agreeing wholeheartedly that "blind faith is bad", and I will re-assert the fact that no reputable Roman Catholic theologian says otherwise. The point here appears to be that even the Magisterium is not above being judged by the private cognitive faculties of the individual Christian, and that means that every Credal statement, every doctrine of the consensus fidelium, is open to the scrutiny of each and every generation of Christians who, on the authority of nothing more than their own private judgment, may accept or reject these teachings at will. I will just pause to say that I don't believe that very many Protestant theologians will endorse such a radical view, but that may not be relevant to everyone. After all, if you're all for private judgment, then why not go all the way?
One reason for not going all the way, of course, is obvious: someone may determine that, according to their own principled reasoning, God is not Three Persons but Two. There would be no way to "refute" such a person, since according to the private judgment argument the only criterion of correctness is consistency with one's own private judgment. Just so long as one's private judgment follows the constraints of logic, then it cannot be "refuted" in any meaningful sense, since the constraints of logic do not constrain one's starting points. In other words, we are back to the problem of orthodox vs. Gnostic heresy. According to this sort of private judgment argument, there is no such thing as heresy; or else everything that one does not think for oneself just is heresy.
This is a puzzle that Wittgenstein made much of in his Philosophical Investigations. There, he argues that there can be no such thing as a "private language", that is, a language in which the system of signs and references and predicates is entirely private. The reason is that language is essentially a public phenomenon: when someone misuses a word, he is corrected by the other members of the language using community. If I call an apple an orange, someone points out my mistake, and tries to get me to refer to apples as apples. If I persist in my error I will never be understood by my fellows. How will they know that I want to eat an apple if the only thing I ever ask for is oranges? Similar, imagine a language that is entirely internal to my own mental life. For example, my internal belief that "This headache I am having today is worse than the one I had last week." The semantic content here is expressed in English, of course, but the references are entirely private: this headache I am having today, the one I had last week. Only I know what those are like because only I experienced them. But how do even I know that the headache I am having today is worse than the one I had last week? In the case of a private language, there is no one to correct mistaken uses of the language. I rely on my memory to judge the difference between the two pains, but how do I know that my memory is serving me correctly? Who will correct me if I am mistaken? If Wittgenstein's intuition here is correct, it is not possible to have a meaningful private language of this kind.
In the case of private judgment the difficulty is very similar, though not identical. The difficulty is simply that, when the criterion of correctness is private judgment itself, there is no mechanism for correction when private judgment is mistaken. (Indeed, private judgment cannot possibly be mistaken!) This difficulty is, in my view, fatal to the whole project.
Is the alternative really nothing more than "blind faith in the Magisterium"? No, not if "Magisterium" is understood properly. When understood properly, faith in it is never blind. In particular, the Catholic assumes a large community of believers who all share a final end, and the pursuit of that end is moved forward by the commonly shared revelation and the commonly shared rational faculty that is distributed among individuals. The individual instantiation of the rational faculty is indeed under private control, but the control we apply to it is governed by the criterion of judgment that comes from the community, a standard that is outside of each one of us as individuals and yet constituted by contributions from certain individuals. The rational faculty guides us individually, but the community corrects us when we err.
I can see no reasonable way around this, or I myself would be a Protestant. I happily await an illustration of how this view fails; in particular, I would love to hear a story about how one could possibly choose between orthodoxy and the Gnostic heresy on the private judgment account. I fear that my desire for that story will be on a par with my desire to beat Tiger Woods at golf.
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Homily for Requiem Mass of Michael Carson, 20 November 2021
Readings OT: Wisdom 3:1-6, 9 [2, short form] Ps: 25 [2] NT: Romans 8:31b-35, 37-39 [6] Alleluia verse: John 6:39 [...
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Doug Kmiec had a rather unpleasant experience at Mass last Sunday, when he was refused Holy Communion on the grounds of his open and unapolo...
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Two dedications in as many days! I dedicate this essay to Dr. Michael Liccione on the occasion of his birthday, 4 December 2006. May he cele...